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TELEVISION SHOWS IN 





“Think of the poor judge who 
is reading . . . hundreds and 
hundreds of these briefs,” says 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, 
Jr. “Liven up their life 
just a little bit . . . with 
something interesting.”2 
In 1942, shortly before he 
ascended to the Supreme 
Court bench, D.C. Circuit 
Judge Wiley B. Rutledge 
similarly advised 
advocates that “[i]t helps 
to break the monotony 
of the printed legal page to add 
a bit of life now and then.”3  
 Justice Antonin Scalia urged brief  writers to “[m]ake it 
interesting.”4 “I don’t think the law has to be dull.” “Legal briefs 
are necessarily illed with abstract concepts that are di cult 
to explain,” Justice Scalia continued.5 “Nothing clariies their 
meaning as well as examples” that “cause the serious legal points 
you’re making to be more vivid, more lively, and hence more 
memorable.”6 
 In the Journal of  the Missouri Bar, I have written about how 
lawyers can “liven up” their advocacy, and add “a bit of  life now 
and then,” with examples drawn from cultural markers that help 
deine American life. Lawyers would follow the lead of  federal 
and state judges, who often spice their opinions with these 
markers. 
 My previous Journal articles have concerned examples drawn 
from baseball, football, and other prominent sports whose basic 
rules, strategies, and terminology are generally well-known to 
lawyers and judges.7 This article concerns examples drawn from 
well-known television shows. 
 In written opinions that decide cases with no claims or 
defenses concerning television programming or the television 
industry, judges often help explain substantive or 
procedural points with references to themes and 
ictional characters from well-known television 
dramas, situation comedies (“sitcoms”), and even 
reality shows. In civil and criminal cases, the 
courts’ careful use of  television references invites 
advocates to use such references carefully in their 
written submissions.
 Some judges use references to television shows 
that regularly feature lawyers and law enforcement; 
other judges discuss shows that mention the law 
rarely or not at all. Some of  the shows (such as 
Perry Mason and Dragnet) feature characters and 
themes that appeared earlier in novels or on radio, 
but recollections of  today’s judges and lawyers 
likely stem primarily from the hit television shows, 
even years after the cited shows left the air.  
 This is a two-part article. This Part I opens with brief  
discussion of  television’s profound decades-old inluence on 
American culture, a sturdy foundation for judges’ conidence 
that readers will connect with references to popular shows that 
dominated the airwaves as today’s generation was growing up. 
This Part then surveys the array of  television dramas that appear 
in federal and state judicial opinions.
 In the Journal’s next issue, Part II will survey the array of  
sitcoms and reality shows that appear in judicial opinions. 
Part II will conclude by discussing why advocates should feel 
comfortable following the courts’ lead by carefully referencing 
television shows to help sharpen substantive and procedural 
arguments in the ilings they submit.
 
Television’s Inluence on American Culture
 “In many ways over the past half-century, the history of  
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television has become the history of  America,” says historian 
Steven D. Stark.8 Television programming, he explains, “has 
been inluential – superseding school, and sometimes even 
the family, as the major inluence on our social and moral 
development. It is fair to say that there have been two eras in 
America: Before Television (BT) and After Television (AT).”9 
Contemporary writers and readers of  briefs and judicial opinions 
grew up in the latter era, marked by television’s dominance in 
American homes from coast to coast.
Transforming American Life
 With television still in its infancy, only nine percent of  U.S. 
households owned at least one set in 1950. Two historians say, 
however, that the new medium was already “inding its place 
in the American living room (and bedroom and dining room 
and kitchen and den and basement and hospital ward and bus 
station).”10 
 From 1954 to 1956, about 10,000 U.S. households a day were 
installing a television set for the irst time.11 By 1955, 13 percent 
of  households owned two or more sets and some owned as many 
as six.12 The percentages of  TV ownership grew each year, 
reaching 64.5 percent of  American households in 1955 and 85.9 
percent in 1959.13  By the end of  the 1950s, households with 
television sets watched an average of  ive hours and two minutes 
of  programming daily.14 
 “Nothing,” wrote journalist David Halberstam, “changed the 
culture and the habits of  Americans more than the coming of  
television.”15 Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Daniel J. Boorstin 
said that the medium “opened another world [that] would 
transform American life more radically than any other modern 
invention except the automobile. . . .  Just as the printing press 
ive centuries before had begun to democratize learning, now the 
television set would democratize experience.”16
 Television, writes legal historian Lawrence M. Friedman, 
became one of  the “powerful forces unifying the economy.”17 
Halberstam called television a “true national phenomenon” 
whose power “revolutionized American society” by “wir[ing] the 
entire country together visually.”18 
 Television’s growing presence in American homes, writes 
presidential historian Jon Meacham, gave Sen. Joseph 
McCarthy “nearly unlimited possibilities to dominate the public 
consciousness” during his few years of  national tumult in the 
irst half  of  the 1950s.19 Meacham adds that the possibility of  
public domination led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to avoid 
overexposure: “I can think of  nothing more boring, for the 
American public,” said the president, “than to have to sit in their 
living rooms for a whole half  hour looking at my face on their 
television screens.”20
“The First Television Generation”
 In 1961, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and historian 
Theodore H. White observed that in the prior decade, television 
had “exploded to a dimension in shaping the American mind 
that rival[ed] that of  America’s schools and churches.”21 
The nation was raising what National Humanities Medal-
winning writer William Manchester called “the irst television 
generation.”22 Historians report that television had become  
“[o]ne of  the most powerful of  all postwar entertainments,”23 
indeed “an American habit and a virtual necessity,”24 and an 
“electronic prodigy endowed with the capacity to inluence an 
entire nation.”25  
 In 1961, Federal Communications Commission chairman 
Newton N. Minow recognized television’s emerging cultural force 
when he sharply criticized the medium as a “vast wasteland,” 
marked by “a procession of  game shows, formula comedies 
about totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, mayhem, 
violence, sadism, murder, western bad men, western good men, 
private eyes, gangsters, more violence, and cartoons.”26 
 “When television is good, nothing — not the theater, not 
the magazines or newspapers — nothing is better,” Minow 
concluded, “[b]ut when television is bad, nothing is worse.”27
 Television took a sharp turn toward the good on September 
2, 1963, when the three major networks expanded their nightly 
newscasts from 15 minutes to half  an hour. Describing this new 
sinew that would help bind the nation together, White called the 
expanded coverage “as signiicant in American history as the 
Golden Spike that linked the Union Paciic and Central Paciic 
to give America is irst continental railway in 1869.”28 
 To paraphrase Minow, television emerged as an indispensable 
force for good when the networks steadied the wounded 
nation in the four fateful days immediately after President 
John F. Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963. 
Journalist White reported that most Americans (Manchester’s 
“irst television generation”) watched virtually non-stop. The 
networks responded with tasteful, informative around-the-
clock broadcasting uninterrupted by commercial advertising. 
Television, said White, “stabilized a nation in emotional shock 
and on the edge of  hysteria.”29
 With its demonstrated capacity to command a national 
audience by the 1960s, television remained on the cutting edge 
of  social change. “The civil rights revolution in the South,” write 
journalists Robert J. Donovan and Ray Scherer, “began when 
a man and the eye of  the television ilm camera came together, 
giving the camera a focal point for events breaking from state to 
state, and the man, Martin Luther King, Jr., high exposure on 
television sets from coast to coast.”30
“A Television Nation”
 In 1969, White reported that television had emerged as “the 
greatest of  all the new media of  American culture,” a common 
denominator that “fused all America into one audience” and 
“held all America captive.”31 With audiences of  40 or 50 million 
viewers from coast to coast, White added, the networks’ nightly 
newscasts alone had become “for the masses, the mirror of  the 
world.”32
 Television’s inluence on American culture continued growing. 
The percentages of  U.S. households owning at least one TV 
set rose from 87.1 percent in 1960 to 95.0 percent in 1969, and 
from 95.2 percent in 1970 to 98.0 percent in 1978.33 The average 
amount of  household time spent daily watching television rose 
from ive hours and six minutes in 1960, to ive hours and 48 
minutes in 1969.34 By 1978, the average daily amount stood at 
six hours and ten minutes,35 and “America’s infatuation with 
television”36 led adults to spend about 28 percent of  their leisure 
time watching the set.37 Americans, said journalist Halberstam, 
now had television “connecting them to the world,” and the 
United States had become “a television nation.”38
 By 2007, the average household’s daily dose of  television had 
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risen to more than eight hours.39 The average child graduates 
from high school after spending 13,000 hours in school and 
25,000 hours in front of  the TV set.40 In the 2017-2018 season, 
96.5 percent of  U.S. homes owned a television, more homes than 
have indoor plumbing.41
 By the 1980s, Americans – including judges and advocates – 
had either grown up during what Manchester called the “Age 
of  Television,”42 or had become increasingly familiar with TV 
programming throughout adulthood. In 1989, one ilm critic 
wrote that “[g]iven the sheer breadth of  its appeal, television 
tends to address – and help create – widely held beliefs that 
permeate the culture.”43
Television Dramas 
 “Writing,” said Sir Ernest Gowers, “is an instrument for 
conveying ideas from one mind to another; the writer’s job is to 
make his reader apprehend his meaning readily and precisely.”44 
Federal and state judges sometimes convey ideas with careful 
references to television dramas, situation comedies, and reality 
shows. We turn here to dramas, before turning to the other two 
genres in Part II of  this article next time.
Perry Mason
 “Ever since the days of  Perry Mason, viewers have always 
locked to shows about lawyers.”45 Prominent among the “lock” 
are lawyers themselves, including Justice Sonia Sotomayor who, 
during her 2009 Senate conirmation hearings for a Supreme 
Court appointment, cited Perry Mason as the childhood inluence 
that led her to pursue a career in law.46
 Perry Mason has been called “America’s lawyer,”47 and his 
dramatic television series remains the lawyers show discussed 
most often in judicial opinions.48 To Supreme Court judges and 
other Americans, the name “Perry Mason” remains almost 
synonymous with the term “lawyer.”49 Indeed, in a National Law 
Journal poll conducted in 1993 (nearly 30 years after the show 
left prime time for syndication), the ictional Mason inished 
second to F. Lee Bailey as the nation’s most admired lawyer.50 
Bailey might not have won the honor after his controversial role 
as a defense counsel in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial shortly 
afterwards. Nor would Bailey’s lofty stature have survived his 
2001 disbarment in Florida,51 and the later unwillingness of  
Maine bar authorities to license him.52
 Defense counsel Perry Mason’s character originated in Erle 
Stanley Gardner’s detective novels and had a successful run in 
four movies and on radio before Raymond Burr played the title 
role in 271 television episodes that aired from 1957 to 1966.53 
Citing Perry Mason’s enduring image as the “lawless”54 lawyer 
who never lost a case,55 most judicial decisions discussing the 
show presume readers’ understanding, without explanation in 
text or footnote. Only a few decisions provide brief  explanations 
to orient readers who might be too young to recall the television 
series, or who might not follow today’s re-runs.56
 Typical in presuming readers’ understanding is Spotted Cat, 
LLC v. Bass, which disqualiied the plaintif’s counsel in a damage 
action on the ground that counsel would be a necessary trial 
witness.57 The federal district court rejected the plaintif’s 
speculation that the defendant “may, upon taking the oath at 
trial, suddenly decide to fully agree with Plaintif’s version of  
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depended on “the occurrence of  a ‘Perry Mason’ moment in the 
courtroom. . . .  [I]n the Court’s experience, such moments are 
usually conined to ictional courtrooms.”59
 The U.S. Court of  Appeals for the 1st Circuit observed that 
defense counsel Mason “possessed an uncanny aptitude for 
exonerating clients by casting blame elsewhere.”60 Representing 
clients whose guilt appeared likely for much of  the hour, he 
would defeat prosecutor Hamilton Burger with dogged personal 
investigation, usually climaxed by Mason’s dramatic cross 
examination that led a key witness or a spectator to break down 
on the stand or elsewhere in the courtroom, often with a tearful 
confession.61 Hence, the “Perry Mason moment.”
 Courts citing Perry Mason recognize that during cross-
examination in actual criminal and civil proceedings, witnesses 
do sometimes break down with key concessions, unanticipated 
information, or tearful confessions.62 But courts also cite Perry 
Mason for the proposition that these climaxes remain “very 
rare”63 because well prepared counsel normally anticipate the 
course of  the trial in the relatively few cases that do not end with 
pretrial settlement or plea bargain, and because contemporary 
procedure emphasizes pretrial discovery and favors conferences 
with the court outside the jury’s presence or earshot when 
surprise does surface.64 Courts frequently call attention to 
Perry Mason defenses65 and Perry Mason moments,66 but also 
recognize (according to the Minnesota Court of  Appeals) that 
such twists and turns “tend only to happen on late night TV if  
your station carries reruns.”67  
continued on page 50. 
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ETHICS
Referral marketing can be a very 
desirable source of new business 
for an attorney. The American 
Bar Association (“ABA”) has noted 
that encouraging referrals in a 
systematic and structured way 
is the most cost-effective and 
productive marketing that an 
attorney can do.2  
 Referring out a matter also can be beneicial to an attorney 
if  a matter is outside of  the referring attorney’s usual practice 
area or outside the referring attorney’s geographical location. 
The referring attorney may be able to share in the fees but does 
not have to learn a new area of  law, obtain licensure in another 
jurisdiction. or travel long distances to handle the matter.  
 While referrals can be beneicial to both the referring and 
receiving attorney, referrals are not without ethical risks. Before 
making or accepting a referral, an attorney should ensure that 
the referral complies with the Rules of  Professional Conduct. 
This article will set out some of  the common ethical issues 
related to referrals. 
Kickbacks, Along With Nominal Nonmonetary Gifts, 
Are Prohibited 
 There is much written about what an attorney can do to 
develop and maintain a referral network to increase business. 
One of  the most common suggestions for an attorney to keep 
and increase a referral network is for the attorney to show his or 
her appreciation to the referring client, third party, or attorney. 
Sending a thank you note to any of  the above referring sources 
is ethically acceptable. However, sending a monetary fee or gift 
to an attorney, client or third party for a referral is prohibited 
by Supreme Court Rule 4-7.2(c). It provides that a lawyer shall 
not give anything of  value to a person for recommending the 
lawyer’s services. 3  It does not contain an exception for nominal, 
nonmonetary gifts.4  Thus, an attorney is prohibited from giving 
the referral source a “substantial monetary kickback” and from 
more innocuous activities such as taking the referral source to 
dinner or sending the referral source a nice bottle of  wine to 
show his or her appreciation for the referral.  
REFERRALS: WHAT YOU 
NEED TO STAY OUT OF 
ETHICAL TROUBLE
Nancy Ripperger1
Fee Sharing with Non-Attorneys Is Prohibited By Rule 
4-5.4(a)
 An attorney should not agree to split or share a fee with a non-
attorney.  Rule 4-5.4(a) prohibits the sharing of  fees with non-
lawyers except in certain limited circumstances.  This prohibition 
includes agreements with non-attorneys to solicit clients in return 
for a share of  the fee.   
Fee Sharing Between Attorneys Requires Strict 
Compliance with Rule 4-1.5(e) 
 Despite the limitations of  Rule 4-7.2 (c), an attorney can split 
or share fees with another attorney if  certain conditions are met. 
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4-1.5(e) addresses the division of  
fees between attorneys who are not from the same irm. The irst 
requirement of  Rule 4-1.5(e) is that both attorneys must retain 
some level of  responsibility for the representation. The courts are 
very strict in applying this requirement. Failing to comply with 
the responsibility requirement can subject an attorney to both 
disciplinary action and the loss of  fees.
 For example, in Risjord v. Lewis,5 an attorney who had handled 
a personal injury action brought a declaratory action to deter-
mine whether the referring attorney was entitled to any of  the at-
torney fees. The fee agreement with the client provided that the 
referring attorney was entitled to 40 percent of  the attorney fees. 
The Court struck down the fee agreement, noting that “merely 
recommending another lawyer or referring a case to another 
lawyer and failing to do anything further” does not entitle the 
referring attorney to any portion of  the fees.6    
 Rule 4-1.5(e) sets forth two situations whereby the referring 
attorney retains the requisite level of  responsibility needed to 
share in the fees. The irst situation is where the referring at-
torney continues to provide legal services to the client along with 
the other attorney.  In other words, the referring attorney acts as 
co-counsel in the matter. In this situation, the division of  the fees 
must be proportional to the services performed by each attor-
ney. Rule 4-1.5 (e)(1).  Courts generally look to see whether the 
division of  fees bears a reasonable correlation to the amount or 
value of  the services rendered by the attorney. Courts will strike 
down a fee division if  there is a glaring imbalance between a 
lawyer’s share of  the fee and the value of  his or her services.7 For 
example, in Eng v. Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho,8 the referring 
attorney was seeking one-third of  the attorney fees. The Court 
noted that passing on updates to the client from the trial attorney 
and providing counseling about the trial process did not consti-
tute one-third of  the work.  
 In the second situation, the referring attorney generally is not 
required to perform any actual work on the referred matter.9 
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share of  the fees each attorney will receive. Comment 7 to Rule 
4-1.5(e).15  However, to avoid fee disputes between the attorneys 
it is recommended that the attorneys have a written agreement 
which sets out both parties’ responsibilities in the matter and the 
fee division between the attorneys.  
 The rule is silent as to which lawyer must obtain the written 
consent from the client.  Missouri courts have not addressed 
the issue but some courts in other jurisdictions have suggested 
that the responsibility falls on both the referring and receiving 
attorney. See Kentucky Bar Association v. Chesley.16 Thus, to avoid any 
potential problem concerning this issue, it is best for both attor-
neys to obtain the consent
.  
Conclusion
 In summary, referrals can be beneicial to an attorney whether 
the attorney is making the referral or receiving the referral. 
However, before an attorney makes a referral or encourages oth-
ers to make referrals to the attorney, an attorney should review 
Missouri Supreme Court Rules 4-1.5(e), 4-5.4(a), and 4-7.2(c) 
and then ensure that his or her conduct is in accordance with the 
rules.
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lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation.” However, Comment 7 
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However, the referring attorney must assume “joint responsi-
bility” for the representation. Comment 7 to Rule 4-1.5 states 
“joint responsibility entails both inancial and ethical responsibil-
ity for the representation as if  the lawyers were associated in a 
partnership.” Missouri courts have not deined what “inancial 
responsibility” or “ethical responsibility” means. However, courts 
from other jurisdictions have deined “inancial responsibility” 
to mean that the referring attorney would be jointly liable in a 
malpractice suit.  See Kummerer v. Marshall.10  Because of  the joint 
inancial liability imposed by Rule 4-1.5(e), the referring attorney 
may want to ascertain whether the receiving attorney has mal-
practice insurance and whether the referring attorney’s malprac-
tice insurance policy covers malpractice of  co-counsel.  
 “Ethical responsibility” is somewhat more di cult to ascertain 
as no court has opined on its meaning. In addition, Missouri has 
not addressed the issue via a formal or informal ethics opinion. 
However, the Wisconsin State Bar Professional Ethics Committee 
Formal Ethics Opinion EF-10-02 (“the Opinion”) is instructive.11 
The Opinion provides clear cut and practical advice on the issue 
of  “ethical responsibility.” It emphasizes that “the duty of  joint 
responsibility imports a serious responsibility as a lawyer and is 
not a mere hand of of  the case to another lawyer to handle in 
his or her own fettered discretion.”  
 The Opinion provides that while the referring attorney need 
not be involved in the day-to-day handling of  the case, the refer-
ring attorney must periodically review the status of  the matter 
and maintain enough contact to ascertain whether the attorney 
handling the matter is abiding by the Rules of  Professional 
Conduct. It also sets forth that the referring attorney has a duty 
to ensure the attorney who receives the referral is competent 
to handle the matter.12 These requirements make clear that the 
referring attorney needs to be very careful in the selection of  the 
attorney to handle the matter and should not base his or her se-
lection merely upon which attorney ofers the referring attorney 
the best fee sharing deal.  
 The Opinion also explains that while the referring attorney 
need not have the same resources or expertise as the receiving 
attorney, the referring attorney must be willing, and able, to 
step in if  the receiving attorney cannot complete the matter. For 
example, per the Opinion, the referring attorney must step in 
if  the receiving attorney becomes unable to act due to illness. 
The referring attorney must take whatever action is necessary 
to protect the client’s interests. This could mean entering an ap-
pearance and requesting a continuance or helping the client to 
ind new counsel. 
 Besides requiring the referring attorney to share some level 
of  responsibility in the case, Rule 4-1.5(e) requires that the fees 
charged be reasonable. In this context, “reasonable” means that 
the total fee should not be signiicantly greater than it would 
have been if  there had been no association with another at-
torney.13 Thus, it is important that the attorneys do not “double 
charge” for doing the same work.  
 Finally, and very importantly, Rule 4-1.5(e) provides that the 
client must agree to the association between the two attorneys 
and the agreement must be “conirmed in writing.14  “Conirmed 
in writing” means either that the client consents to the referral 
in writing or that the lawyer  promptly sends a writing to the 
client conirming the client’s oral informed consent to the refer-
ral.  Rule 4-1.0(b). While the client must consent to the associa-
tion, the attorneys are not required to disclose to the client what 
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SUPREME COURT RULE CHANGES
 The Supreme Court of  Missouri, in an order dated December 
4, 2018, repealed subdivision 8.09, entitled “Admission by 
Transferred Uniform Bar Examination Score,” of  Rule 8 
(Admission to the Bar), and in lieu thereof  adopted a new 
subdivision 8.09, entitled “Admission by Transferred Uniform 
Bar Examination Score.”
 This order becomes efective January 1, 2019.
 The complete text of  the order may be read in its entirety at 
www.courts.mo.gov.
 In an order dated December 3, 2018, the Supreme Court  
of  Missouri repealed subdivision 74.11(a), entitled 
“Acknowledgement of  Satisfaction,” of  Rule 74 (Judgments, 
Orders and Proceedings Thereon), and adopted a new 
subdivision 74.11(a), entitled “Acknowledgement of  Satisfaction.”
 This order becomes efective July 1, 2019.
 The complete text of  the order may be read in its entirety at 
www.courts.mo.gov.
 The Supreme Court of  Missouri, in an order dated December 
3, 2018, adopted and approved for distribution forms for motion 
to modify child support and related instructions prepared by that 
Court’s Committee on Access to Family Courts and reviewed by 
the State Judicial Records Committee and the Supreme Court. 
 The forms are efective July 1, 2019 and may be used 
prior thereto. These forms supersede any similar forms and 
instructions previously approved by the Supreme Court of  
Missouri.
 The complete text of  the order may be read in its entirety at 
www.courts.mo.gov.
 In an order dated December 18, 2018, the Supreme Court 
of  Missouri corrected an order of  June 29, 2018, when it 
repealed and adopted provisions of  Rule 37, entitled “Statutory 
and Ordinance Violations and Violation Bureaus,” including 
repeal of  subdivision 37.43 (Ordinance Violation – Summons 
or Arrest Warrant – When Issued – Failure to Appear); 
subdivision 37.435 (Statement of  Probable Cause); subdivision 
(f) of  subdivision 37.64 (Sentence and Judgment); subdivision 
37.65 (Imposition and Payment of  Fines, Fees, and Costs, and 
Contempt Proceedings); and the heading title and subdivision 
37.66 (Sentence of  Imprisonment – Transcript to Corrections 
Oicial) and in lieu thereof  adopted a new subdivision 37.43 
(Ordinance Violation – Summons or Arrest Warrant – When 
Issued – Failure to Appear); a new subdivision 37.435 (Statement 
of  Probable Cause); a new subdivision (f) of  subdivision 37.64 
(Sentence and Judgment); a new subdivision 37.65 (Imposition 
and Payment of  Fines, Fees, and Costs, and Contempt 
Proceedings); and a new heading title and new subdivision 37.66 
(Sentence of  Incarceration – Transcript to Corrections Oicial).
 This order became efective January 1, 2019.
 The complete text of  the order may be read in its entirety at 
www.courts.mo.gov.
 The Supreme Court of  Missouri, in an order dated December 
18, 2018, repealed subdivision 21.03 (Misdemeanors – Summons 
or Warrant of  Arrest – When Issued); subdivision 21.04 
(Misdemeanors – Statement of  Probable Cause – Contents); 
subdivision 21.05 (Misdemeanor – Summons – Contents); the 
heading title and subdivision 21.06 (Misdemeanors – Warrant 
of  Arrest – Contents); the heading title and subdivision 21.09 
(Misdemeanors – Appearance Under Warrant Before Judge); 
and the heading title and subdivision 21.10 (Misdemeanors 
– Initial Proceedings Before Judge), of  Rule 21, entitled 
“Procedure Applicable to Misdemeanors Only,” and lieu thereof  
adopted a new subdivision 21.03 (Misdemeanors – Summons 
or Warrant of  Arrest – When Issued); a new subdivision 21.04 
(Misdemeanors – Statement of  Probable Cause – Contents); a 
new subdivision 21.05 (Misdemeanor – Summons – Contents); 
a new heading title and a new subdivision 21.06 (Misdemeanors 
– Warrant for Arrest – Contents); a new heading title and a new 
subdivision 21.09 (Misdemeanors – Appearance Under Warrant 
Before the Court); and a new heading title and a new subdivision 
21.10 (Misdemeanors – Initial Appearance Before the Court).
 In the same order, the Court repealed subdivision 22.03 
(Felonies – Statement of  Probable Cause – Contents); subdivision 
22.04 (Felonies – Warrant of  Arrest – When Issued); the heading 
title and subdivision 22.05 (Felonies – Warrant of  Arrest – 
Contents); the heading title and subdivision 22.07 (Felonies – 
Appearance Under Warrant Before Judge); the heading title and 
subdivision 22.08 (Felonies – Initial Proceedings Before Judge); 
and subdivision 22.09 (Felonies – Preliminary Hearing) of  Rule 
22, entitled “Procedure Applicable to Felonies Only,” and in lieu 
thereof  adopted a new subdivision 22.03 (Felonies – Statement 
of  Probable Cause – Contents); a new subdivision 22.04 
(Felonies – Warrant of  Arrest – When Issued); a new heading 
title and a new subdivision 22.05 (Felonies – Warrant for Arrest 
– Contents); a new heading title and a new subdivision 22.07 
(Felonies – Appearance Under Warrant Before the Court); a 
new heading title and a new subdivision 22.08 (Felonies – Initial 
Appearance Before the Court); and a new subdivision 22.09 
(Felonies – Preliminary Hearing).
 In addition, the Court repealed subdivision 33.01 
(Misdemeanors or Felonies – Right to Release – Conditions); the 
heading title and subdivision 33.02 (Misdemeanors or Felonies 
– Warrant for Arrest – Oicials Authorized to Set Conditions 
of  Release – Conditions to be Stated on Warrant); subdivision 
33.04 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Oicer Authorized to Accept 
Conditions of  Release); the heading title and subdivision 33.05 
(Misdemeanors or Felonies – Right to Review of  Conditions); 
subdivision 33.06 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Modiication 
of  Conditions of  Release); subdivision 33.07 (Misdemeanors 
or Felonies – Rules of  Evidence Inapplicable); the heading title 
and subdivision 33.08 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Rearrest 
of  Accused); subdivision 33.09 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – 
Failure of  Court to Set Conditions or Setting of  Inadequate 
or Excessive Conditions for Release – Application to Higher 





TAXES IN YOUR PRACTICE
Scott E. Vincent
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(TCJA) created substantial 
changes for taxpayers.  As 
practitioners and the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) work 
through implementation of the 
TCJA, guidance is being issued 
from the IRS.  This article 
outlines several key items for 
consideration as we begin 
2019.
Business Meals and Entertainment
 The TCJA disallowed deductions for 
entertainment, amusement, and recreation 
activities. However, the new provisions did not 
address when the food and beverages might 
constitute entertainment. The IRS has issued new 
guidance (Notice 2018-76) allowing taxpayers 
to deduct 50 percent of  business meal expenses 
if: (a) the expense is an ordinary and necessary 
trade or business expense; (b) the expense is not 
lavish or extravagant under the circumstances; (c) 
the taxpayer, or an employee of  the taxpayer, is present at the 
furnishing of  the food or beverages; (d) the food and beverages 
are provided to a current or potential business customer, client, 
consultant, or similar business contact; and (e) in the case of  
food and beverages provided during or at an entertainment 
activity, the food and beverages are purchased separately from 
the entertainment, or the cost of  the food and beverages is stated 
separately from the cost of  the entertainment on one or more 
bills, invoices, or receipts.
Meals for Convenience of  Employer
 The IRS has issued counsel advice (AM 2018-004) 
regarding the Code § 119 exclusion from employee income for 
meals furnished on the employer’s business premises for the 
convenience of  the employer. In Commissioner v. Kowalski,2 the 
U.S. Supreme Court determined that the § 119 exclusion only 
applies if  meals are necessary for the employee to properly 
perform duties for the employer. Under this “convenience of  
the employer” test, carrying out of  the employee’s duties must 
require that the employer provide the employee meals so that 
the employee can properly discharge such duties and be done for 
noncompensatory business reasons. Treasury regulations include 
meals provided for employees with short meal periods due to 
the employer’s business or employees who must be available 
for emergency calls during meal periods. Prior cases have 
found that the IRS is precluded from substituting its judgment 
for the business decisions of  a taxpayer regarding business 
needs and related employer policies. However, the IRS can 
determine whether an employer actually follows and enforces 
its own stated business policies and practices, and whether these 
policies and practices, and the needs and concerns they address, 
necessitate the provision of  meals so that there is a substantial 
noncompensatory business reason for furnishing 
meals to employees.
Depreciation and Expensing
 The IRS has issued Revenue Procedure 2019-8 
with guidance on deducting expenses under § 179 
and the alternate depreciation system (ADS) under 
§ 168(g), as amended by the TCJA. The Revenue 
Procedure explains how qualiied real property, as 
deined under the TCJA, can be treated as property 
eligible for the § 179 expense election. The TCJA 
increased the § 179 deduction to $1 million and 
increased the phase-out limit to $2.5 million, 
with indexing for inlation after 2018. The TCJA 
also amended the deinition of  qualiied real 
property to include qualiied improvement property and some 
improvements to nonresidential real property, including: roofs; 
heating, ventilation and air-conditioning property; ire protection 
and alarm systems; and security systems. The Revenue 
Procedure outlines how real property trades or businesses or 
farming businesses that elect out of  the TCJA interest deduction 
limitations may change to the ADS for property placed in service 
before 2018; the IRS also addresses whether these changes may 
be a change in accounting method. In addition, the Revenue 
Procedure provides an optional depreciation table for residential 
rental property depreciated under the ADS with a 30-year 
recovery period.
Partnerships
 The IRS issued inal regulations implementing the new 
centralized partnership audit regime. The inal regulations are 
generally efective for partnership tax years beginning after 2017, 
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Suspension of  Personal Exemption
 The IRS issued Notice 2018-84 with interim guidance to 
clarify how the suspension of  the personal exemption deduction 
from 2018 through 2025 under the TCJA applies to certain rules 
that reference that provision but were not also suspended. These 
include rules dealing with the healthcare premium tax credit, 
and the individual shared responsibility provision (also known 
as the individual mandate) for 2018. The notice conirms that, 
for purposes of  other provisions, the suspension of  the personal 
exemption by reducing the exemption amount to zero shall not 
be considered in determining whether a deduction is allowed or 
allowable, or whether a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction. The 
reduction of  the personal exemption to zero is not intended to 
alter the operation of  other provisions of  the Code that refer to a 
taxpayer allowed a deduction.
Afordable Care Act Hardship Exemption and Deadline 
Extensions
 The IRS has issued Notice 2019-5 with additional hardship 
exemptions from the individual shared responsibility payment 
(also known as the individual mandate) that a taxpayer may 
claim on a federal income tax return without obtaining a 
hardship exemption certiication from the Health Insurance 
Marketplace. The IRS also issued Notice 2018-94 extending one 
of  the due dates for the 2018 information reporting requirements 
under the ACA for insurers, self-insuring employers, and 
certain other providers of  minimum essential coverage, and 
the information reporting requirements for applicable large 
employers (ALEs). If  applicable, the due date for these parties 
to furnish certain ACA forms is extended to March 4, 2019. 
Transition relief  from certain penalties for good faith eforts to 
comply with the ACA information reporting requirements is also 
extended.
Limitation on Business Interest Expense Deductions
 For tax years beginning after 2017, the TCJA provides that the 
deduction allowed for business interest for any tax year cannot 
exceed the sum of: (1) business interest income; (2) 30 percent 
of  adjusted taxable income (but not less than zero); plus (3) loor 
plan inancing interest (certain interest paid by vehicle dealers). 
 The term “business interest” means any interest properly 
allocable to a trade or business.  However, the deduction limit on 
business interest does not apply to interest properly allocable to 
an “electing real property trade or business.” The IRS has issued 
Revenue Procedure 2018-59 to provide a safe harbor that allows 
taxpayers to treat certain infrastructure trades or businesses 
as real property trades or businesses solely for purposes of  
qualifying as an electing real property trade or business. The 
Revenue Procedure identiies infrastructure property that 
may qualify, including airports, docks, ports, mass commuting 
facilities, water furnishing and disposal facilities, sewage and 
waste disposal facilities, and several others.
Penalty Avoidance
 The IRS issued Revenue Procedure 2019-9 identifying 
circumstances under which disclosure on a taxpayer’s income 
but partnerships can make an election to have the provisions 
apply to earlier periods. Under the new rules, adjustments to 
partnership-related items are determined at the partnership 
level. The inal regulations clarify that items or amounts are 
partnership-related items only if  shown, or required to be 
shown, on the partnership return or required to be maintained 
in the partnership’s books and records. Partners must report 
these partnership-related items consistent with the treatment 
on the partnership’s return or provide adequate notice to the 
IRS of  inconsistent treatment. A partner can provide notice to 
the IRS of  inconsistent treatment by attaching a statement to 
the partner’s return (including any amended return) on which 
the partnership-related item is treated inconsistently. If  the IRS 
adjusts partnership-related items, the partnership, rather than 
the partners, is subject to liability for any imputed underpayment 
and must take other adjustments into account in the adjustment 
year. Alternatively, the regulations allow a partnership to 
make an election to distribute the efect of  the adjustments 
to its partners for the year that adjustments are made by the 
IRS, causing the partners to pay any tax due as a result of  the 
adjustments.
State and Local Tax and Charitable Contributions
 For tax years beginning after 2017, the TCJA limits an 
individual’s deduction to $10,000 ($5,000 in the case of  a 
married individual iling a separate return) for the aggregate 
amount of  the following state and local taxes paid during the 
calendar year: (1) real property taxes; (2) personal property taxes; 
(3) income, war proits, and excess proits taxes; and (4) general 
sales taxes. This limitation does not apply to certain taxes that 
are paid and incurred in carrying on a trade or business or 
a for-proit activity. Since the enactment of  the TCJA, some 
taxpayers sought to avoid the limitation by making deductible 
charitable payments to charitable entities pursuant to state and 
local tax credit programs. During 2018, the IRS issued guidance 
undermining this strategy, inding that charitable contributions 
were reduced by the amount of  any “quid pro quo” return tax 
credit beneit. However, the IRS has now released Revenue 
Procedure 2019-12 with safe harbors that do allow a deduction 
for certain payments made by a C corporation or a “speciied 
pass-through entity” to or for the use of  a charitable organization 
if  the paying entity receives or expects to receive a state or local 
tax credit in return for the payment. If  qualiied, the payment 
is treated as meeting the requirements of  an ordinary and 
necessary business expense for the business entity.
 The Revenue Procedure safe harbor only applies to speciied 
pass-through if: (1) the entity is a business entity other than a C 
corporation that is regarded for all federal income tax purposes 
as separate from its owners; (2) the entity operates a trade or 
business; (3) the entity is subject to a state or local tax incurred 
in carrying on its trade or business that is imposed directly 
on the entity; and (4) in return for a payment to a charitable 
organization, the entity receives or expects to receive a state or 
local tax credit that the entity applies or expects to apply to ofset 
a state or local tax described in (3), above, other than a state or 
local income tax.
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tax return with respect to an item or position is adequate to 
reduce understatement of  tax for purposes of  the substantial 
understatement accuracy-related penalty and for purposes of  
the tax return preparer penalty for understatements due to 
unreasonable positions. The Revenue Procedure applies to 
2018 tax returns and outlines speciic information that must be 
provided for certain items, including:  itemized deductions on 
Form 1040 (Schedule A); certain trade or business expenses; 
diferences in book and income tax reporting; certain foreign tax 
items; and other items such as moving expenses and employee 
business expenses. The Revenue Procedure also requires that 
money amounts entered on a form must be veriiable, which 
means the taxpayer can prove the origin of  the amount (even 
if  that number is not ultimately accepted by the IRS) and the 
taxpayer can show good faith in entering that number on the 
applicable form.  Further, when the amount of  an item is shown 
on a line that does not have a preprinted description (such as 
on an unnamed line under an “Other Expense” category), the 
taxpayer must clearly identify the item by including a description 
on that line. For items not covered by this Revenue Procedure 
and for related party transactions, adequate disclosure requires 
iling a Form 8275 (Disclosure Statement) or 8275-R (Regulation 
Disclosure Statement).
Conclusion
 Hopefully, this is a good summary for review by you and 
your clients as we begin 2019.  Be careful to watch for ongoing 
changes in Congress and at the IRS in coming months.
Endnote
 1 Scott E. Vincent is the founding member of  Vincent Law, LLC in Kansas 
City.
 2 Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
Someimes reaching out for help
is the bravest move you can make.





John H. Bleckman, age 70, of  St. Louis on September 23, 
2018. He joined The Missouri Bar in 1984 and practiced law in 
St. Louis.
David N. Clayton of  Hannibal on December 8, 2018 at 
the age of  46. He received his law degree from the University 
of  Missouri-Kansas City. He irst joined the Public Defender 
Oice in Columbia. In 2014, Governor Jay Nixon appointed 
him Marion County prosecutor. He was later elected to that 
position and served until his death. He was a member of  
The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Association of  Prosecuting 
Attorneys, and the 10th Judicial Circuit Bar Association. 
Donald H. Clooney, age 88, of  St. Louis on November 25, 
2018. He is a veteran of  the U.S. Air Force, where he served as 
a captain and was drafted by the U.S. Water Polo Team to play 
in the 1952 Olympics. He earned his law degree from Saint 
Louis University and practiced law for more than 50 years.
Hon. Frank D. Connett Jr. of  St. Joseph on November 6, 
2018 at the age of  96. He served in the U.S. Army Air Corps 
during World War II. In 1949, he received an LL.B. degree 
from the University of  Missouri.  He served as Buchanan 
County assistant prosecuting attorney from 1951-1954 and as 
prosecutor from 1955-1958. In 1957, he was president of  the 
Missouri Association of  Prosecuting Attorneys. Beginning in 
1958, he was an elected judge of  Division III of  the 5th Judicial 
Circuit for 30 years. He served as an honorary colonel on the 
staf of  Governor John Dalton. In 2002, the Missouri Bar 
Foundation honored him with the Spurgeon Smithson Award.
Edward A. Cook III, age 88, of  Georgetown, TX on August 
13, 2018. During the Korean War he served in the U.S. Army 
Counter Intelligence Corps. He received his law degree from 
the University of  Missouri and joined The Missouri Bar in 
1953. For ive decades he practiced law in Lexington, NE 
with Cook & Cook Law Oice, and later Cook, Kopf  & 
Doyle Law Oice. He was also president of  First State Bank 
in Gothenburg, NE and president of  the Nebraska Cultural 
Endowment.
Hon. Wesley C. Dalton of  Wright City on December 16, 
2018 at the age of  60. He joined The Missouri Bar in 1988, 
and was the presiding circuit judge for the 12th Judicial Circuit, 
comprised of  Warren, Montgomery and Audrain counties.
Gary I. Froistad, age 75, of  Savannah, GA on October 25, 
2018. He earned his J.D. from the University of  South Dakota 
and joined The Missouri Bar in 1990.
Virginia L. Fry of  Springield on November 18, 2018 at the 
age of  64. She earned her J.D. from the University of  Missouri-
Kansas City. In 1994, she was the irst female president of  the 
Springield Metropolitan Bar, and is the only woman to receive 
its Distinguished Attorney Award. In 1998, she joined Husch 
Blackwell, LLP as a partner, serving as oice managing partner 
from 2008 until 2015. She served as a member of  The Missouri 
Bar Board of  Governors from 2007-2008.  In 2015, Missouri 
Lawyers Media honored her as Woman of  the Year. She was 
elected as chair of  the Missouri State University Board of  
Governors in 2017.
Susan M. Hunt, at 66, on November 27, 2018. Prior to 
receiving her law degree from the University of  Missouri-
Kansas City, she was a chemist with the Kansas City Police 
Department. She joined The Missouri Bar in 1986 and spent 
most of  her career as a solo pracitioner.
Edwin P. McKaskel of  Wildwood on March 1, 2018 at the 
age of  79. He received his law degree from the University 
of  Mississippi and joined The Missouri Bar in 1977. After 
graduation, he became a special agent for the F.B.I., then 
general manager of  asset protection for AT&T, retiring after 35 
years.
Joseph J. Nitka Jr. of  St. Louis on July 12, 2018 at the age of  
89. He received his law degree from Saint Louis University and 
joined The Missouri Bar in 1956. He retired at the age of  82 
after serving as a labor arbitrator for more than 40 years.
Pastor/Honorable John F. Payne, age 72, of  Kansas 
City on November 4, 2018. He was a veteran of  the U.S. Air 
Force and earned his J.D. from the University of  Missouri-
Kansas City. He practiced law as a partner of  Gray, Payne & 
Roque before serving as a family court commissioner for the 
16th Judicial Circuit Court, Juvenile Division 41, for nearly 18 
years, retiring in 2008. In 2003, the Missouri Governor and 
General Assembly established the commission on Children’s 
Justice and named Payne as a member. Ordained in 1992, he 
was called to be pastor of  the Temple of  Faith in 2003. He 
served as a member of  the board of  Niles Home for Children 
and in November 2009 was named Outstanding Family 
Advocate-2009 by the Cornerstones of  Care.
Stacey M. Reines of  Overland Park, KS on October 18, 
2018 at the age of  63. She received her J.D. from Washington 
University and joined The Missouri Bar in 1981. She started 
her career as in-house counsel at the Housing Authority of  
Kansas City and most recently worked at Meico Lamp Parts.
Daniel D. Sawyer, age 89, of  Leawood, KS on October 
15, 2018. In 1946, he joined the U.S. Army Air Forces and 
served in Japan as a paratrooper. In 1956, he earned his law 
degree from the University of  Missouri-Kansas City and joined 
The Missouri Bar. That same year, he joined the law irm of  
Hubbell, Lane & Sawyer, where he practiced law for more than 
40 years before his retirement. He then served as of  counsel 
for the Barnes Law Firm for several years before his inal 
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retirement. In addition to being past president of  the Missouri 
Association of  Trial Attorneys, he was an active member of  
the VFW, having served as commander of  Pete Dover Post 
302.
Hon. Harvey J. Schramm of  Brentwood on December 
9, 2018 at the age of  80. He was a veteran of  the U.S. Army, 
serving in the Active Army Reserves from 1960-1961. He 
earned his law degree from Washington University and 
served as St. Louis County prosecutor for three years before 
the governor appointed him as judge at the St. Louis County 
Courthouse, where he served eight years. He continued in his 
private law practice for more than 35 years. He also served as 
president of  the St. Louis Chapter of  B’nai B’rith and on the 
board of  directors of  the American Jewish Congress. 
Don R. Wintermeyer of  Georgetown, TX on July 27, 2018 
at the age of  77. He joined The Missouri Bar in 1966.
The Journal of The Missouri Bar publishes items in the "In Memoriam" section as 
they are received. To honor the lives and achievements of deceased members,  
The Missouri Bar solicits additional information about these men and women from 
family members or printed obituaries. When that information is not provided or 
is otherwise unavailable, the Journal will print only the deceased ’s name, city of 
residence, and date of death.
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academics, community members, elected oicials, or other 
interested stakeholders, Missouri lawyers are positioned and 
able to help others work together to address today’s problems 
in a productive and collaborative way. I invite you to join your 
Missouri Bar in fostering these important conversations to 
improve our profession, the law, and the lives of  our fellow 
Missourians.
Endnotes
 1  Raymond E. Williams is an attorney with Williams Law Oices, LLC in 
West Plains.
 2 See Joseph P. Lash, Helen and Teacher: The Story of  Helen Keller and Anne Sullivan 
Macy (Radclife 1980).





 7 See, e.g., Dan Kittay, Bringing People Together: The Bar’s Role as Convener, BaR 
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A case building technical research service exclusively for 
lawyers. Provides detailed engineering investigations, report 
preparation, case preparation advice, and reference to expert 
witnesses. Specializing in cases involving water issues and civil 
engineering. Registered Professional Engineers with Ph.D.s; 
707 Rutland Drive, Columbia, MO 65203; (O)573/447-0245; 




THE CHOICE OF A LAWYER IS AN IMPORTANT DECISION AND SHOULD NOT BE BASED
SOLELY UPON ADVERTISEMENTS.
Classified Ad Rates: $1.25 per word for members of The Missouri Bar or surviving spouse of deceased members ($30 minimum); $2.00 per word for non-
members and for organizations not related to The Missouri Bar ($50 minimum). No discount for repeat insertions. Copy for ads must be received 15 days 
prior to the first day of the month of issue: February, April, June, August, October and December. Any element surrounded by spaces is a word.
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Chicago/Illinois Attorney – Missouri Bar member. Wash. 
U. Law grad, available for referral or to serve as local counsel 
in Chicago and Northern Illinois. Steven I. Rapaport, 
847/559-9270. E-mail: raplaw@ameritech.net.




11/20/18 Richard L. Winkie
 #59455
 101 E. Sheridan St.
 P.O. Box 502
 Macon, MO 63552
1/9/19 Jefrey B. Allen
 #58252
 255 N. Adams, Ste. C
 P.O. Box 996
 Lebanon, MO 65536
 Suspensions
10/30/18 Bryce C. Crowley
 #64800
 901 N. Pine St., #110
 Rolla, MO 65401
11/20/18 Mary L. Lemp
 #63027
 1717 Park Ave.
 St. Louis, MO 63104
12/4/18 Bryan E. Bennett
 #54779
 65A King St.
 Burlington, VT 05401
12/18/19 Scott A. Bailey
 #47515
 518 S. Hanley Rd.
 St. Louis, MO 63105
12/27/18 Babette P. Salus
 #35321
 1100 S. 5th St.
 Springield, IL 62703
 Reprimands
12/4/18 Joe G. Harms II
 #23989
 111 N. Taylor Ave., Ste. C
 Kirkwood, MO 63122
12/4/18 David C. Salivar
 #24205
 111 N. Taylor Ave., Ste. C
 Kirkwood, MO 63122
12/18/18 Brent L. Winterberg
 #44038
 4310 Madison Ave., Ste. 209
 Kansas City, MO 64111-3435
 Probations
11/21/18 Raymund J. Capelovitch
 #41537
 7470 Stanford Ave.
 St. Louis, MO 63130
12/4/18 Joel B. Eisenstein
 #21476
 600 Hill Pointe Ct., Ste. 200
 St. Charles, MO 63309
12/18/18 William Asa Hutchinson III
 #60278
 912 W. Central Ave.
 Bentonville, AR 72712
 Reinstatements
11/5/18 C. Christopher Lozano
 #39497
 8019 Knights Crossing Dr.
 O’Fallon, MO 63368
12/4/18 David A. Kraft
 #49512
 12308 Wegona Ln.




 112 S. Hanley, Ste. 200
 St. Louis, MO 63105
11/1/18 Robert B. Leggat Jr.
 #23780
 112 S. Hanley, Ste. 200
 St. Louis, MO 63105
11/1/18 Lamar E. Ottsen Jr.
 #18682
 112 S. Hanley, Ste. 200
 St. Louis, MO 63105
11/26/18 Bradford C. Emert
 #36118
 11934 Bedford Dr.
 St. Louis, MO 63131
12/6/18 Jay R. Yorke
 #35023
 16 E. Stoddard St.
 P.O. Box 621
 Dexter, MO 63841 
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NOTICES OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
Notice of Corporate Dissolution Rates: $1.25 per word for a member of 
The Missouri Bar; $2.00 for non-members. For purposes of the total word 
count, any element surrounded by spaces is considered to be a word. DO 
NOT SEND A CHECK with the notice. You will be invoiced in advance of 
publication, and all invoices must be paid prior to publication.
 Copy must be received by February 20 (for March/April issue), April 20 (for 
May/June issue), June 20 (for July/August issue), August 20 (for September/
October issue), October 20 (for November/December issue), and December 
20 (for January/February issue).
 Send notices to Cynthia Heerboth at The Missouri Bar, P.O. Box 119, 
Jefferson City, MO 65101, by e-mail to cheerboth@mobar.org.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
WIL-MAR ACRES, LP
 On October 16, 2018, WIL-MAR ACRES, LP, a Missouri 
limited partnership, iled a Cancellation of  Registration with the 
Missouri Secretary of  State.
 Persons with claims against the limited partnership are 
requested to present them in accordance with the Notice 
of  Winding Up. You must furnish your name, address, and 
telephone number together with the following: (1) Amount of  
the claim; (2) Basis for the claim; and (3) Documentation of  the 
claim.
 Claims must be mailed to: Robert C. Black, 245 Main St.,  
P.O. Box 2058, Platte City, MO 64079.
 A claim against the limited partnership will be barred unless 
a proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3) 
years after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
ABLES MANOR PROPERTIES, LLC
 On October 30, 2018, Ables Manor Properties, LLC, a 
Missouri limited liability company (hereinafter the “Company”), 
iled its Notice of  Winding Up for a Limited Liability Company 
with the Missouri Secretary of  State.
 Any claims against the Company may be sent to: Terry Cole, 
1311 Columbine, Sikeston, Missouri 63801. Each claim 
must include the following information: name, address, and 
phone number of  the claimant; amount claimed; date on which 
the claim arose; the basis for the claim; and documentation in 
support of  the claim.
 All claims against the Company will be barred unless the 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years 
after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
THE GREEN CORPORATION
 On October 30, 2018, The Green Company, Inc. iled its 
articles of  dissolution with the Missouri Secretary of  State. The 
dissolution was efective on October 30, 2018.
 You are hereby notiied that if  you believe you have a claim 
against The Green Company, Inc., you must submit a summary 
in writing of  the circumstances surrounding your claim to the 
Corporation in care of  Patrick E. White, P.O. Box 7183, Kansas 
City, MO 64113. The summary of  your claim must include the 
following information:
 1. The name, address, and telephone number of  the claimant.
 2. The amount of  the claim.
 3. The date on which the event on which the claim is based 
occurred.
 4. A brief  description of  the nature of  the debt or the basis for 
the claim.
 All claims against The Green Company, Inc. will be barred 
unless the proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within 
two years after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
ARBORS AT KEHRS MILL, LLC
 Arbors at Kehrs Mill, LLC, a Missouri limited liability 
company, iled its Notice of  Winding Up with the Missouri 
Secretary of  State on October 30, 2018.
 Any and all claims against Arbors at Kehrs Mill, LLC may be 
sent to Robert Berra, 5091 New Baumgartner Road,  St. Louis,  
Missouri 63129. Each claim should include the following 
information: the name, address, and telephone number of  the 
claimant; the amount of  the claim; the basis for the claim; and the 
date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
 Any and all claims against Arbors at Kehrs Mill, LLC will be 
barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced 
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
DEER & DUCKS, LLC
 Deer & Ducks, LLC, a Missouri limited liability company, iled 
its Notice of  Winding Up with the Missouri Secretary of  State on 
October 30, 2018.
 Any and all claims against Deer & Ducks, LLC may be sent to 
Robert Berra, 5091 New Baumgartner Road, St. Louis, Missouri 
63129. Each claim should include the following information: 
the name, address, and telephone number of  the claimant; the 
amount of  the claim; the basis for the claim; and the date(s) on 
which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
 Any and all claims against Deer & Ducks Mill, LLC will be 
barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced 
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
THE VILLAS AT SUSON HILLS, LLC
 The Villas at Suson Hills, LLC, a Missouri limited liability 
company, iled its Notice of  Winding Up with the Missouri 
Secretary of  State on October 30, 2018.
 Any and all claims against The Villas at Suson Hills, LLC may 
be sent to Robert Berra, 5091 New Baumgartner Road,  
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St. Louis, Missouri 63129. Each claim should include the 
following information: the name, address, and telephone number 
of  the claimant; the amount of  the claim; the basis for the claim; 
and the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based 
occurred.
 Any and all claims against The Villas at Suson Hills, LLC will 
be barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced 
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
WILMAS FARM, LLC
 Wilmas Farm, LLC, a Missouri limited liability company, iled 
its Notice of  Winding Up with the Missouri Secretary of  State 
on October 30, 2018.
 Any and all claims against Wilmas Farm, LLC may be sent to 
Robert Berra, 5091 New Baumgartner Road, St. Louis, Missouri 
63129. Each claim should include the following information: 
the name, address, and telephone number of  the claimant; the 
amount of  the claim; the basis for the claim; and the date(s) on 
which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
 Any and all claims against Wilmas Farm, LLC will be barred 
unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced within 
three (3) years after the date this notice is published.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
KCL GEORGIA CREDIT PARTNERS IIA, LLC
 KCL Georgia Credit Partners IIA, LLC iled its Notice of  
Winding Up on November 5, 2018.
 The company requests that all claims be presented 
immediately by letter to: Malika Simmons, c/o Kansas City Life 
Insurance Company, 3520 Broadway, KCMO 64111. Claims 
must include name, address, and telephone number of  claimant; 
amount; the basis for the claim; and documentation.
 All claims against the company shall be barred unless a 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years 
after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
MCP 2010, LLC
 MCP 2010, LLC iled its Notice of  Winding Up on  
November 5, 2018.
 The company requests that all claims be presented 
immediately by letter to: Malika Simmons, c/o Kansas City Life 
Insurance Company, 3520 Broadway, KCMO 64111. Claims 
must include name, address, and telephone number of  claimant; 
amount; the basis for the claim; and documentation.
 All claims against the company shall be barred unless a 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years 
after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
MISSOURI CREDIT PARTNERS 2002, LLC
 Missouri Credit Partners 2002, LLC iled its Notice of  
Winding Up on November 5, 2018.
 The company requests that all claims be presented 
immediately by letter to: Malika Simmons, c/o Kansas City Life 
Insurance Company, 3520 Broadway, KCMO 64111. Claims 
must include name, address, and telephone number of  claimant; 
amount; the basis for the claim; and documentation.
 All claims against the company shall be barred unless a 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years 
after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
PREMIER PAPER AND PACKAGING, INC.
 On October 8, 2018, Premier Paper and Packaging, Inc., a 
Missouri corporation (the “Corporation”), iled its Articles of  
Dissolution with the Missouri Secretary of  State. The dissolution 
was efective upon this date.
 You are hereby notiied that if  you believe you have a claim 
against the Corporation, you must submit a written summary of  
your claim to the Corporation care of  The Law Firm of  Haden 
& Haden, ATTN: Brent Haden, PO Box 7166, Columbia, MO 
65205. The summary of  your claim must include the following 
information:
 1. The name, address, and telephone number of  claimant;
 2. The amount of  the claim;
 3. The date on which the claim is based occurred;
 4. A brief  description of  the nature of  the debt or the basis of  
the claim; and
 5. Whether the claim is secured, and if  so, the collateral used 
as security.
 All claims against the Corporation will be barred unless this 
summary is received within 2 years of  this notice. 
NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LBR – LAMBERT, LLC
 On November 7, 2018, LBR – Lambert, LLC iled its Notice 
of  Winding Up for Limited Liability Company with the Missouri 
Secretary of  State. The notice was efective on November 7, 
2018.
 YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if  you believe you 
have a claim against LBR – Lambert, LLC, you must submit a 
summary in writing of  the circumstances surrounding your claim 
to the said LBR – Lambert, LLC at the following address:
 LBR – Lambert, LLC, 2107 Ridgecrest Street, Chillicothe, 
Missouri 64601.
 Telephone: (660) 973-4490.
 The summary of  your claim must include the following information:
 1. The name, address, and telephone number of  the claimant;
 2. The amount of  the claim;
 3. The date on which the event for which the claim is based occurred; 
and
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 4. A brief  description of  the nature of  the debt or the basis for 
the claim.
 All claims against LBR – Lambert, LLC will be barred unless 
the proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three 
(3) years after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LBR – FAIR, LLC
 On November 7, 2018, LBR – Fair, LLC iled its Notice of  
Winding Up for Limited Liability Company with the Missouri 
Secretary of  State. The notice was efective on November 7, 
2018.
 YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if  you believe you 
have a claim against LBR – Fair, LLC, you must submit a 
summary in writing of  the circumstances surrounding your claim 
to the said LBR – Fair, LLC at the following address:
 LBR – Fair, LLC, 2107 Ridgecrest Street, Chillicothe, 
Missouri 64601.
 Telephone: (660) 973-4490.
 The summary of  your claim must include the following 
information:
 1. The name, address, and telephone number of  the claimant;
 2. The amount of  the claim;
 3. The date on which the event for which the claim is based 
occurred; and
 4. A brief  description of  the nature of  the debt or the basis for 
the claim.
 All claims against LBR – Fair, LLC will be barred unless the 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3) 
years after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LBR – FAIRVIEW, LLC
 On November 7, 2018, LBR – Fairview, LLC iled its Notice 
of  Winding Up for Limited Liability Company with the Missouri 
Secretary of  State. The notice was efective on November 7, 
2018.
 YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if  you believe you 
have a claim against LBR – Fairview, LLC, you must submit a 
summary in writing of  the circumstances surrounding your claim 
to the said LBR – Fairview, LLC at the following address:
 LBR – Fairview, LLC, 2107 Ridgecrest Street, Chillicothe, 
Missouri 64601.
 Telephone: (660) 973-4490.
 The summary of  your claim must include the following 
information:
 1. The name, address, and telephone number of  the claimant;
 2. The amount of  the claim;
 3. The date on which the event for which the claim is based 
occurred; and
 4. A brief  description of  the nature of  the debt or the basis for 
the claim.
 All claims against LBR – Fairview, LLC will be barred unless 
the proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three 
(3) years after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
ABC OF SOUTHEAST MISSOURI, L.L.C.
 On November 9, 2018, ABC of  Southeast Missouri, L.L.C., a 
Missouri limited liability company (hereinafter the “Company”), 
iled its Notice of  Winding Up for a Limited Liability Company 
with the Missouri Secretary of  State.
 Any claims against the Company may be sent to: Terry Cole, 
1515 East Malone, Sikeston, Missouri 63801. Each claim 
must include the following information: name, address, and 
phone number of  the claimant; amount claimed; date on which 
the claim arose; the basis for the claim; and documentation in 
support of  the claim.
 All claims against the Company will be barred unless the 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years 
after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO
ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS
AGAINST GREEN CROW, LLC
 Notice is hereby given that Green Crow, LLC, a Missouri 
limited liability company (the “Company”), is being liquidated 
and dissolved pursuant to the Missouri Limited Liability 
Company Act (the “Act”).  This notice is being given pursuant to 
Section 347.141 of  the Act.
 All persons with claims against the Company should submit 
them in writing in accordance with this notice to:  Vatterott 
Harris P.C., Attn:  Paul J. Harris, 2458 Old Dorsett Road,  
Suite 230, Maryland Heights, MO  63043.
 Claims against the Company must include: (1) the claimant’s 
name, address, and phone number; (2) the amount claimed; 
(3) the date the claim arose; (4) the basis of  the claim; and (5) 
documentation supporting the claim.
 A claim against the Company will be barred unless a 
proceeding to enforce the claim is enforced within three years 
after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION 
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS
AGAINST FIRST BANC INSURANCE
SERVICES CORPORATION
 On October 16, 2018, FIRST BANC INSURANCE 
SERVICES CORPORATION, a Missouri corporation, iled its 
Articles of  Dissolution by Voluntary Action with the Secretary of  
State of  Missouri, efective on October 16, 2018.
 Any claims against FIRST BANC INSURANCE SERVICES 
CORPORATION may be sent to: Legal Department, 11901 
Olive Blvd., Suite 212 Creve Coeur, Missouri 63141. Each claim 
must include the following information: name, address, and 
telephone number of  the claimant; amount claimed; date on 
which the claim arose; basis for the claim; and documentation 
supporting the claim.
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 Each claim will be barred unless a proceeding to enforce it is 
commenced within two (2) years after publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST 
SUMMER CASUAL, LLC
 You are hereby notiied that on November 6, 2018, Summer 
Casual, LLC, a Missouri limited liability company (“LLC”) was 
dissolved upon the iling of  its Articles of  Termination with the 
Missouri Secretary of  State.
 Said LLC requests that all persons and organizations who 
have claims against it present them immediately by letter to the 
LLC c/o Checkett & Pauly, PC, PO Box 409, Carthage, MO 
64836, Attention: Sarah Kersh. All claims must include: (1) the 
name and address of  the claimant; (2) the amount claimed; 
(3) the basis for the claim; (4) the documentation of  the claim; 
and (5) the date(s) of  the event(s) on which the claim is based 
occurred.
 Notice: Because of  the termination of  Summer Casual, 
LLC, any claims against it will be barred unless a proceeding 
to enforce the claim is commenced within three years after the 
publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LAUREL HOTEL MANAGER, LLC
 Laurel Hotel Manager, LLC, a Missouri limited liability 
company, iled its Notice of  Winding Up for Limited Liability 
Company with the Missouri Secretary of  State on November 29, 
2018.
 Any and all claims against Laurel Hotel Manager, LLC 
may be sent to Brian J. Beck, 7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 400, 
Clayton, MO 63105. Each claim should include the following 
information: the name, address, and telephone number of  the 
claimant; the amount of  the claim; the basis of  the claim; and 
the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based 
occurred.
 Any and all claims against Laurel Hotel Manager, LLC will be 
barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced 
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LAUREL HOTEL MASTER TENANT, LLC
 Laurel Hotel Master Tenant, LLC, a Missouri limited liability 
company, iled its Notice of  Winding Up for Limited Liability 
Company with the Missouri Secretary of  State on November 29, 
2018.
 Any and all claims against Laurel Hotel Master Tenant, LLC 
may be sent to Brian J. Beck, 7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 400, 
Clayton, MO 63105. Each claim should include the following 
information: the name, address, and telephone number of  the 
claimant; the amount of  the claim; the basis of  the claim; and 
the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based 
occurred.
 Any and all claims against Laurel Hotel Master Tenant, 
LLC will be barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim 
is commenced within three (3) years after the date this notice is 
published.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LAUREL APARTMENTS MASTER TENANT, LLC
 Laurel Apartments Master Tenant, LLC, a Missouri limited 
liability company, iled its Notice of  Winding Up for Limited 
Liability Company with the Missouri Secretary of  State on 
November 29, 2018.
 Any and all claims against Laurel Apartments Master Tenant, 
LLC may be sent to Brian J. Beck, 7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 400, 
Clayton, MO 63105. Each claim should include the following 
information: the name, address, and telephone number of  the 
claimant; the amount of  the claim; the basis of  the claim; and the 
date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
 Any and all claims against Laurel Apartments Master Tenant, 
LLC will be barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim 
is commenced within three (3) years after the date this notice is 
published.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
C & D AUTO AND MUFFLER, LLC
 On December 6, 2018, C & D Auto and Muler, LLC, a 
Missouri limited liability company (the “Company”), iled its 
Notice of  Winding Up for a Limited Liability Company with the 
Missouri Secretary of  State.
 Any claims against the Company may be sent to: Kyle 
Harmon, Lowther Johnson Attorneys at Law, LLC, 901 E St. 
Louis St, 20th Floor, Springield, MO 65806. Each claim must 
include the following information: name, address, and phone 
number of  the claimant; amount claimed; date on which the 
claim arose; the basis for the claim; and documentation in 
support of  the claim.
 All claims against the Company will be barred unless the 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years 
after publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST 
RANDOM APP, INC.
 On December 10, 2018, Random App, Inc., a Missouri 
corporation, iled its Articles of  Dissolution with the Missouri 
Secretary of  State. Dissolution was efective on December 10, 2018.
 Said corporation requests that all persons and organizations 
who have claims against it present them immediately by letter to 
the corporation at:
 Random App., Inc.
 David P. Weiss, Esq.
 Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard P.C.
 600 Washington Avenue, 15th Floor
 St. Louis, MO 63101
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 All claims must include the name and address of  the claimant; 
the amount claimed; the basis for the claim; copies of  any 
documents or instruments upon which the claim arises; and 
the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based 
occurred.
 NOTICE: Because of  the dissolution of  Random App, 
Inc., any claims against it will be barred unless a proceeding 
to enforce the claim is commenced within two years after 
the publication date of  the two notices authorized by statute, 
whichever is published last. 
NOTICE OF WINDING UP
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
SERENDIPITY GALLERY LLC
 Serendipity Gallery LLC, a Missouri limited liability company 
(the “Company”), was dissolved on December 9, 2018 by iling a 
Notice of  Winding Up with the Missouri Secretary of  State.
 The Company requests that all persons and entities with 
claims against the Company present them in writing and by mail 
to Lisa A. Houdyshell, 8124 General Sheridan Lane, St. Louis, 
MO 63123.
 Each claim must include:
 1. The name, address, and telephone number of  the claimant;
 2. The amount of  the claim;
 3. The basis of  the claim;
 4. The date the claim arose; and
 5. Documentation of  the claim.
 A claim against the Company will be barred unless a 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3) 
years after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP
OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
KOENIG WILLIAMSBURG PROPERTY, L.P.
 On this 4th day of  December 2018 KOENIG 
WILLIAMSBURG PROPERTY, L.P., hereinafter referred to 
as (“LIMITED PARTNERSHIP”), iled its Notice of  Winding 
Up for a Limited Partnership with the Missouri Secretary of  
State.
 All persons and organizations with claims against the Limited 
Partnership must submit a written summary of  any and all 
claims against the Limited Partnership to ZOLLMANN 
LAW LLC, Attention: W. J. Zollmann, III, 511 West Pearce 
Boulevard, Wentzville, Missouri 63385, which summary shall 
include the name, address, and telephone number of  the 
claimant; the amount of  the claim; date(s) the claim accrued; a 
brief  description of  the nature and basis of  the claim; and any 
documentation of  the claim.
 Claims against the Limited Partnership will be barred unless 
a proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3) 
years after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP
OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
KOENIG AUXVASSE PROPERTY, L.P.
 On this 4th day of  December 2018 KOENIG AUXVASSE 
PROPERTY, L.P., hereinafter referred to as (“LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP”), iled its Notice of  Winding Up for a 
Limited Partnership with the Missouri Secretary of  State.
 All persons and organizations with claims against the Limited 
Partnership must submit a written summary of  any and all 
claims against the Limited Partnership to ZOLLMANN 
LAW LLC, Attention: W. J. Zollmann, III, 511 West Pearce 
Boulevard, Wentzville, Missouri 63385, which summary shall 
include the name, address, and telephone number of  the 
claimant; the amount of  the claim; date(s) the claim accrued; a 
brief  description of  the nature and basis of  the claim; and any 
documentation of  the claim.
 Claims against the Limited Partnership will be barred unless 
a proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3) 
years after the publication of  this notice.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
MAXSON-SPA BUILDING LLC
 Maxson-Spa Building LLC, a Missouri limited liability 
company, iled its Notice of  Winding Up for Limited Liability 
Company with the Missouri Secretary of  State on December 11, 
2018.
 Any and all claims against Maxson-Spa Building LLC may be 
sent to Rosenblum Goldenshersh, P.C., c/o David S. Lang, Esq., 
7733 Forsyth Blvd., 4th Floor, St. Louis, MO 63105. Each claim 
should include the following information: the name, address, and 
telephone number of  the claimant; the amount of  the claim; the 
basis of  the claim; and the date(s) on which the event(s) on which 
the claim is based occurred.
 Any and all claims against Maxson-Spa Building LLC will be 
barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced 
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
DIAMOND LITE, INC.
 On December 17, 2018, Diamond Lite, Inc. iled Articles of  
Dissolution by Voluntary Action with the Missouri Secretary of  
State. The dissolution was efective on December 31, 2018.
 Claims against the Corporation must be submitted to 
Diamond Lite, Inc., c/o Allen & Rector, P.C., Attorneys at Law, 
135 Harwood Avenue, P.O. Box 1700, Lebanon, Missouri 65536.
 Claims must include: (1) The name, address, and telephone 
number of  the claimant; (2) The amount and date of  the claim; 
and (3) a brief  description of  the basis of  the claim, including 
documentation.
 NOTICE: All claims will be barred unless a proceeding to 
enforce the claim is commenced within two years after the date 
of  the publication of  this notice.
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NOTICE OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
MACKS CREEK BANCSHARES, INC.
 Macks Creek Bancshares, Inc., a Missouri corporation, iled 
its Articles of  Dissolution with the Missouri Secretary of  State.
 All claims against the corporation should be sent to David 
L. Wieland, Wieland & Condry, LLC, 1548 E. Primrose, 
Springield, MO 65804.  Each claim should include the 
following:  name, address, and telephone number of  the 
claimant; amount of  the claim; the date the claim accrued; and 
the basis of  the claim and any documentation.
 All claims against the corporation shall be barred unless a 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within two years 
after the date of  this publication.
NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
CARRIE REDEVELOPMENT, LLC
 On December 19, 2018, CARRIE REDEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, a Missouri limited liability company, iled its Articles of  
Termination and Notice of  Winding Up for Limited Liability 
Company with the Missouri Secretary of  State, efective on 
December 31, 2018.
 Said limited liability company requests that all persons 
and organizations who have claims against it present them 
immediately by letter to the company at:
 CARRIE REDEVELOPMENT, LLC
 Attn: Mary C. Kickham, Manager
 14001 New Bedford Court
 Chesterield, MO 63017
With a copy to:
 Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C.
 Attn: Anthony J. Soukenik, Esq.
 600 Washington Avenue, 15th Floor
 St. Louis, MO 63101
 (314) 231-3332
 All claims must include the name and address of  the 
claimant; the amount claimed; the basis for the claim; and 
the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based 
occurred.
 NOTICE: Because of  the notice of  winding up of  CARRIE 
REDEVELOPMENT, LLC, any claim against it will be 
barred unless a proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced 
within three (3) years after the publication date of  the notices 
authorized by statute, whichever is published last.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF
LAS VEGAS, LLC
 On December 19, 2018, COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL 
SCHOOLS OF LAS VEGAS, LLC, a Missouri limited liability 
company, iled its Notice of  Winding Up with the Missouri 
Secretary of  State, efective on December 19, 2018.
 Said limited liability company requests that all persons 
and organizations who have claims against it present them 
immediately by letter to the company at:
 COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF LAS 
VEGAS, LLC
 Attn: JR&M, LLC
 648 Trade Center Boulevard
 Chesterield, MO 63005
or
 Ann Bodewes Stephens, Esq.
 Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C.
 600 Washington Avenue, 15th Floor
 St. Louis, MO 63101
 All claims must include the name and address of  the claimant; 
the amount claimed; the basis for the claim; and the date(s) on 
which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
 NOTICE: Because of  the notice dissolution of  
COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF LAS 
VEGAS, LLC, any claim against it will be barred unless a 
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within the 
statutorily authorized timeframe after the publication date of  the 
notices authorized by statute, whichever is published last. 
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
SNAGTAGG LLC
 On November 19, 2018, SNAGTAGG LLC, a Missouri 
limited liability company, iled its Notice of  Winding Up with 
the Missouri Secretary of  State. Dissolution was efective on 
December 19, 2018.
 Said limited liability company requests that all persons 
and organizations who have claims against it present them 
immediately by letter to the company at:
 SNAGTAGG LLC
 Attn: James S. Gans
 648 Trade Center Boulevard
 Chesterield, MO 63005
or
 Ann Bodewes Stephens, Esq.
 Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C.
 600 Washington Avenue, 15th Floor
 St. Louis, MO 63101
 All claims must include the name and address of  the claimant; 
the amount claimed; the basis for the claim; and the date(s) on 
which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
 NOTICE: Because of  the dissolution of  SNAGTAGG LLC, 
any claim against it will be barred unless a proceeding to enforce 
the claim is commenced within the statutorily authorized 
timeframe after the publication date of  the notices authorized by 
statute, whichever is published last. 
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
CASA BELLA DEVELOPMENT, LLC
 On December 14, 2018, Casa Bella Development, LLC, a 
Missouri limited liability company, iled its Notice of  Winding 
Up for Limited Liability Company with the Missouri Secretary 
of  State.
 Said limited liability company requests that all persons and 
organizations who have claims against it present them by letter 
immediately to the company in care of: Rick J. Muenks, Attorney 
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at Law, 3041 S. Kimbrough Avenue, Suite 106, Springield, 
Missouri 65807. Claims must include name and address of  
claimant; amount of  claim; basis of  claim; and documentation 
of  claim.
 Pursuant to Section 347.141 RSMo, any claim against Casa 
Bella Development, LLC will be barred unless a proceeding 
to enforce the claim is commenced within three years after the 
publication of  this notice. 
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LEXINGTON SQUARE, LLC
 On December 14, 2018, Lexington Square, LLC, a Missouri 
limited liability company, iled its Notice of  Winding Up for 
Limited Liability Company with the Missouri Secretary of  State.
 Said limited liability company requests that all persons and 
organizations who have claims against it present them by letter 
immediately to the company in care of: Rick J. Muenks, Attorney 
at Law, 3041 S. Kimbrough Avenue, Suite 106, Springield, 
Missouri 65807. Claims must include name and address of  
claimant; amount of  claim; basis of  claim; and documentation 
of  claim.
 Pursuant to Section 347.141 RSMo, any claim against 
Lexington Square, LLC will be barred unless a proceeding to 
enforce the claim is commenced within three years after the 
publication of  this notice. 
The Flag
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doctrine in Missouri. Southers v. City of  Farmington, 263 
S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008). The protection is 
codiied by Sections 537.600 to 537.650. As a public 
entity, Bi-State was entitled to sovereign immunity from 
tort liability except to the extent immunity was waived 
under Section 537.600.52
 “By its plain language, Section 537.600 applies to the “public 
entity,” Bi-State, and not its employee, Allen. Additionally, by its 
plain language, it is clear that the statutory immunity aforded 
Bi-State under the statute does not apply to its employee 
driver.”53 “Section 537.610.5 further provides for annual 
adjustments on the limit amounts listed, and, at the time of  trial 
court’s amended judgment in  2017, the limit amount for a single 
accident or occurrence was $414,418 (rather than $300,000).”54
 We ind State ex rel. Trimble v. Ryan, 745 S.W.2d 
672,675 (Mo. banc 1988) directly on point. In Trimble, 
an action arose out of  alleged negligence in a driver’s 
operation of  a Bi-State bus. The Missouri Supreme 
Court concluded that Bi-State was entitled to sovereign 
immunity under Section 537.600 and a reduction of  
the damage award under Section 537.610; however, the 
Court speciically held Bi-State’s driver was not entitled 
to a reduction.55
 “More recent caselaw has similarly found that the immunity 
provision does not apply to the agent-employee of  the 
government entity….”56 “Therefore, because Missouri law 
clearly provides that the statutory cap set forth in Section 
537.610.2 does not apply to public employees arising out of  
the operation of  motor vehicles within the course of  their 
employment, the trial court did not err in denying Appellants’ 
Motion for Remittitur with respect to Allen.”57 
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Business Contracts and 
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Adams to either accept Forbush’s ofer in its entirety or purchase 
Forbush’s shares on the same terms and conditions as contained 
in Forbush’s ofer (including the unrelated terms).
 The court held that “[b]ecause Texas Shootout Provisions are 
focused on setting a fair buyout price and nothing in the cross-
purchase agreement indicated the Texas Shootout Provision in 
this case was meant to encompass anything beyond that, . . . 
the additional terms and conditions in Forbush’s ofer were not 
contemplated by the Texas Shootout Provision.”64 Therefore, 
Forbush’s ofer did not conform to the requirements of  the 
agreement’s Texas Shootout Provision. 
 Although non-conforming, the Eastern District held that 
Forbush’s ofer was not entirely void, as the parties need not 
be conined to the dictates of  the Texas Shootout Provision in 
winding up their business.65 After considering Adams’ partial 
acceptance of  Forbush’s ofer, the Eastern District held that 
Adams’ “purported acceptance” was in fact a “counterofer” as it 
“introduce[d] new or variant terms[.]”66 Because Forbush never 
responded to Adams’ counterofer, the counterofer failed, and 
the parties never reached an enforceable agreement.67
Contractual Limitations on Remedies and Damages
 Another provision that partners, shareholders, or members 
may include in their governing contractual business agreement 
is a “limitation of  liability or damages” provision. Such a 
provision places limitations or prohibitions on a party’s exposure 
to legal liability or damages. An example of  such a provision 
was considered in Jacobson Warehouse Co., Inc. v. Schnuck Markets, 
Inc.68 In Jacobson, the parties’ agreement included the following 
“limitation of ” provision:
[U]nless otherwise prohibited by law, neither party shall 
be liable for incidental or consequential damages or 
indirect, special or punitive damages. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing limitations on types of  damages, in the 
event that [the plaintif, d/b/a XPO Logistics Supply 
Chain] would otherwise be liable to Schnucks for 
consequential, indirect, special or punitive damages, 
XPO shall be liable to Schnucks for such damages up 
to Schnucks’ self-insured retention under any applicable 
insurance policy maintained by Schnucks, not to exceed 
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000)[.] 69
 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of  Missouri 
considered whether such a provision barred the defendant’s 
negligence claim. Defendant Schnuck contended that the 
provision applied only “to contractual claims under the agreement, and 
[did] not waive liability for damages consequential to a negligence 
claim.”70 The plaintif, on the other hand, argued that the 
limitation of  liability provision applied to Schnuck’s negligence 
claim, and the claim must therefore be dismissed.
 “It is well-settled in Missouri that sophisticated business 
entities may contractually limit future remedies.”71 Such  
“[c]ontractual limitations of  liability . . . for consequential 
damages do not violate public policy where the language is ‘clear, 
unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous.’”72 The Jacobson 
court considered the plain language of  the operating agreement 
and held that the provision precluded recovery on Schnuck’s 
negligence claim, and dismissed the claim to the extent it sought 
damages barred by the provision limiting liability.73 Jacobson 
demonstrates both the wisdom in, and potential danger of, 
liability limitation provisions. These provisions can protect 
parties from future internal disputes, but may also have the efect 
of  limiting legal remedies in the event of  a total breakdown of  
the relationship.
Important Issues to Consider When Drafting 
Agreements and Litigating Claims
The Economic Loss Doctrine
 The economic loss doctrine prohibits a plaintif from seeking 
to recover in tort for economic losses that are contractual in 
nature.74 “The doctrine exists to protect the integrity of  the 
bargaining process, through which the parties have allocated 
the costs and risks.”75 “Missouri courts have recognized speciic 
exceptions to the economic loss doctrine in cases involving a 
iduciary relationship or negligence in providing professional 
services. Another recognized exception applies where the 
defendant breached a public duty.”76
 In Jacobson, plaintif XPO entered into an operating 
agreement with defendant Schnuck “setting forth terms and 
conditions under which XPO would provide certain warehouse 
management services for [Schnuck’s] new distribution facility.”77 
Ultimately, the relationship deteriorated, and in the ensuing 
litigation between the parties, “Schnuck allege[d] that XPO was 
negligent in operating the Facility. Speciically, Schnuck claimed 
that XPO breached its duty of  care by ‘failing to conduct its 
operations pursuant to prevailing warehouse industry practices 
and inadequately planning, hiring, training, staing, and 
supervising’ at the Facility.”78
XPO [alleged] that Schnuck’s negligence claim should 
be dismissed [pursuant to] the economic loss doctrine 
because it is not independent of  its breach of  contract 
claim; both claims reference the same subject matter of  
the Agreement – management of  the Facility, and the 
same standard of  care – “prevailing warehouse industry 
standards.”79 
The Eastern District disagreed with XPO and denied its 
motion to dismiss Schnuck’s negligence claim on the basis of  
the economic loss doctrine. Although XPO’s agreement “to 
adhere to [certain] performance requirements” originated in the 
operating agreement, Missouri law provides that “while a mere 
breach of  contract does not provide a basis for tort liability, the 
negligent act or omission which breaches the contract may serve 
as a basis for an action in tort.”80
 In determining whether a claim is prohibited by the economic 
loss doctrine, the following should be considered: “If  the duty 
arises solely from the contract, the action is contractual. The 
action may be in tort, however, if  the party sues for breach of  
a duty recognized by the law as arising from the relationship or 
status the parties have created by their agreement.”81
 Applying this, the Eastern District held that because 
Schnuck allege[d] that XPO was obligated to “perform 
the services necessary for the proper, accurate and eicient 
operation of  the Facility” and to perform those services 
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“in a good, professional, workmanlike, expeditious, and 
economical manner, consistent with the most eicient 
operation of  the warehouse in accordance with the 
standards and prevailing practices in the warehouse 
industry,” . . . Schnuck’s negligence claim [did] not arise 
solely in contract and [would] not be dismissed [pursuant 
to the economic loss doctrine.]82
 Additionally, the Eastern District held that where, as in 
Jacobson, the “contracting parties ‘require the exercise of  
reasonable skill, diligence, and care in the handling of  business 
given over or entrusted to’ a defendant, a special relationship . . . 
is created by [that] contract.”83 In that case, “[a] tort action may 
be pursued ‘if  the party sues for breach of  a duty recognized by 
the law as arising from the relationship or status the parties have 
created by their agreement.’”84 
 Lastly, Schnuck “assert[ed] that because XPO provided 
professional services to Schnuck and held itself  out as a 
professional by representing it was skilled in the warehousing 
business and capable of  operating the Facility consistently with 
prevailing practices in the warehousing industry, the professional 
services exception to the economic loss doctrine applie[d].”85 
The professional services exception to the economic loss doctrine 
“is applied to negligence claims involving [individuals] who have 
been held to a professional, rather than an ordinary, standard 
of  care and who have provided professional services to the 
plaintif.”86 The court agreed that this exception could apply, and 
declined to rule that Schnuck’s negligence claim arose solely in 
contract and was barred by the economic loss doctrine.
Joint Ventures and Morley v. Square, Inc.
 A “joint venture” is subject to the same legal principles as a 
partnership.87 “Indeed, the legal principles for determining the 
existence of  a joint venture have been said to be identical to 
those for determining a partnership, and the two may be created 
in the same ways.”88 In Morley, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of  Missouri, Eastern Division, applied Missouri 
law to determine whether a joint venture existed between 
plaintif Morley and defendants McKelvey and Dorsey. Plaintif 
Morley “allege[d] that Dorsey, McKelvey, and Morley ‘agreed 
to create and develop a mobile credit card transaction business’ 
which ‘used [plaintif] Morley’s inventions [and ideas].’”89 
Plaintif [Morley] allege[d] that McKelvey and Dorsey 
breached the [joint venture] agreement by refusing to 
recognize Morley’s one-third ownership and control 
interests, incorporating a new company, funneling all 
assets out of  the joint venture and into that new company, 
and excluding Morley from ownership in and control of  
that company.90
 McKelvey and Dorsey sought summary judgment on Morley’s 
joint venture claim, arguing that Morley could not “overcome 
the steep standard of  proof  required to establish [the] claim.”91 
This argument required the court to determine which burden 
of  proof  standard is required “to establish a joint venture”; i.e., 
“a preponderance of  the evidence standard” or “a clear and 
convincing evidence standard.” The court acknowledged that 
Missouri law was confusing on the issue, but that the 
. . . last pronouncement by the Supreme Court of  
Missouri…in Grissum [v. Reesman], 505 S.W.2d 81, noted 
that the burden is a preponderance of  the evidence 
unless the joint venture at issue involves “an oral contract 
to convey real estate or the establishment of  a resulting 
trust in real property,” in which case the higher clear and 
convincing burden applies.92 
 Relying on this Supreme Court of  Missouri precedent, the 
Morley court held that the correct standard in determining 
whether a joint venture exists is preponderance of  the evidence.93  “The 
clear and convincing standard . . . is simply the exception to the 
general rule for those two particular categories of  cases.”94
 Applying the preponderance of  the evidence standard, the 
Morley court considered whether there was a dispute of  fact 
regarding the existence of  a joint venture. Plaintif Morley 
argued there was “ample evidence of  the parties’ . . . intent to 
carry on . . . as co-owners[,]”95 including:
(1) the circumstances of  Morley’s invitation to be part of  
the enterprise; (2) the transformative nature of  Morley’s 
. . . contribution; (3) the lack of  a consulting agreement 
[with Morley] in light of  the fact that other “consultants” 
had such agreements; . . . ([4]) verbal and written 
representations by the parties and others; and ([5]) [the 
defendants’] inal negotiations with Morley.96
     Defendants, on the other hand, argue[d] that [a joint 
venture did not exist because] Morley did not share in 
the company’s proits or risk of  losses, had no voice in 
management or role in the direction of  the company, 
had no role in employment decisions, had no ability to 
enter contracts for the company, was not held out as a 
partner [to third-parties, and was willing to] accept[] a 
mere 1% . . . stake in the company.”97
 The court considered the parties’ arguments and explained 
that “when one party contributes the capital and the other the 
labor, skill or experience for carrying on a joint enterprise, such a 
combination constitutes a partnership unless something appears 
to indicate the absence of  a joint ownership of  the business and 
proits.”98 Further, the court explained that, pursuant to Missouri 
law, “‘there need not necessarily be an agreement to share losses” 
in order to ind an implied partnership.”99 The court ultimately 
denied defendants’ motion for summary judgement, inding that 
it was
clear to this Court that McKelvey and Dorsey intended 
to work with Morley to build a business in the mobile 
payments industry. Whether or not that intention rose to 
the level of  a joint venture or partnership appears to this 
Court to be a question for the jury.100 
 An important factor for the court was that Morley’s idea 
in using a cell phone to read a credit card’s magnetic strip (as 
opposed to defendants’ original idea of  using the phone camera to 
capture credit card numbers) was transformative because it changed 
the entire direction of  defendants’ thinking and business plan: 
Plaintif asks how defendants could pursue an entire 
business on that idea, in collaboration with Morley, and 
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not believe that such a pursuit and collaboration was 
signiicant, probative evidence of  whether or not the 
parties intended to carry on as co-owners. This Court 
agrees.
     Morley had not suggested a mere logo or a company 
name – his idea and prototype shaped the company 
itself.101
 The court rejected defendants’ argument that the court’s 
denial of  their motion for summary judgment would “open the 
loodgates to partnership claims by every entry level startup 
employee.”102 The court explained:
[D]efendants once again downplay the importance 
of  Morley’s contribution and role within the business. 
Considering the totality of  the circumstances – 
the parties’ preexisting relationships, McKelvey’s 
invitation to “play” and earlier communications about 
entrepreneurial activity with Morley, the transformative 
nature of  Morley’s idea and his work in bringing that 
idea to life, Morley’s continued role within the business 
and his work to patent the card reader (paid for by 
McKelvey), the promise of  a “stock deal,” just to name 
a few – there is at least a question of  fact as to whether 
the parties intended to carry on this business as co-
owners.103
 The court went on to deny defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment as it related to plaintif Morley’s fraud-based claims. 
Morley contended – and the court agreed – that when the 
evidence was presented to the jury, “the same facts that support 
Morley’s joint venture claim could alternatively lead the jury to 
a slightly diferent conclusion: that is, although defendants may 
not have intended to start a business as co-owners with Morley, 
they did intend to defraud him in order to obtain, without 
compensation, his contributions.”104
 Morley is an important case for business attorneys to be familiar 
with, as it provides an example of  individuals coming together 
to perform business without drawing clear lines as to what their 
relationship will consist of, resulting in a ight over a joint venture 
claim. Morley also demonstrates that in the event a plaintif is 
wrong that a partnership or joint venture existed between the 
parties, the plaintif may still have a viable fraud claim on which 
he can recover.
Who Can Be Held Liable for Breach of  Contract?
 A person can be held liable for breaches of  a corporate 
agreement if  that person signed the agreement in their individual capacity. 
This is distinguishable from a situation in which a person signs in 
a representative capacity, such as on behalf  of  an entity or trust. In 
that situation, the person will not be held liable in his individual 
capacity. 
 In Gryphon Investments III, LLC ex rel. Schenk v. Wehrle,105 for 
example, the court dismissed a breach of  contract claim where 
the plaintif sought to hold a defendant individually liable based 
on the defendant’s signature on the operating agreement in his 
capacity as a trustee. The court stated: “Gryphon III alleges that 
Wehrle’s actions of  diverting funds from Gryphon III breached 
the Operating Agreement. However, Wehrle is not a party to the 
Operating Agreement. He signed that document in his capacity 
as the trustee of  the John S. Wehrle Revocable Living Trust.”106 
As such, Wehrle could not be held liable in his individual 
capacity for breach of  the operating agreement. 
 This standard similarly applies to arbitration provisions 
in operating agreements.107 In Springield Iron & Metal, LLC v. 
Westfall, the Missouri Court of  Appeals – Southern District 
considered whether individuals who sign an operating agreement 
in their representative capacities could enforce an arbitration 
provision located in the operating agreement for claims they 
bring individually. The company at issue – Springield Iron & 
Metal, LLC – had two members: Westfall (an individual) and 
Griesedieck Brothers (an LLC with two owners – Paul and 
Chris). Westfall signed Springield Iron & Metal, LLC’s operating 
agreement in his individual capacity.108 Paul and Chris signed the 
operating agreement in their representative capacities as members 
of  Griesedieck Brothers, LLC.109 During an ensuing lawsuit 
between the parties in which Paul, Chris, and Springield Iron & 
Metal brought claims against Westfall, Paul and Chris moved to 
compel arbitration on all claims based on Springield’s operating 
agreement.110
 Westfall contended that only the agreement’s signers were 
subject to arbitration.111 Paul and Chris irst argued that they 
were “‘entitled to the beneit of  arbitration’ because [they] each 
had a ‘close relationship’ with [Griesedieck Brothers, LLC (which 
signed the operating agreement)] and non-arbitration of  their 
claims ‘would eviscerate’ [Springield’s] operating agreement.”112 
The court disagreed, holding that “[t]o compel arbitration of  
non-signatory claims – even those ‘inextricably intertwined’ 
with signatory claims – ‘is inconsistent with the overarching rule 
that arbitration is ultimately a matter of  agreement between the 
parties.’”113  
 The court further rejected the argument that, as the agents 
for Griesedieck Brothers, LLC, Paul and Chris share the LLC’s 
“power to compel arbitration under the operating agreement[:]”
The agreement does not name the Griesediecks as 
parties or treat them as such, nor did they sign it as 
individuals, but only as members of  [Griesedieck 
Brothers, LLC]. By signing only as agents in a 
representative capacity, the Griesediecks are not bound 
by or to the agreement as individuals…. It is the 
principal that can be bound by the signature of  the 
agent, not the agent that can be bound by the signature 
of  the principal.114
 The court similarly found unconvincing Paul’s and Chris’s 
argument that it was “‘only logical’ and eicient for everyone to 
arbitrate” all claims together and that “inconsistency [may arise] 
if  some claims are arbitrated while others are not.”115 The court 
held that the Supreme Court of  Missouri “deems arbitration 
a matter of  agreement, even if  arbitrated and non-arbitrated 
issues are ‘inextricably intertwined.’”116 “We are not free to 
erode arbitration’s voluntary nature for the sake of  judicial 
convenience.”117
Business Contracts – Unlimited Power?
 While parties have broad discretion to enter into contractual 
agreements to govern their business relationships, such discretion 
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is not unlimited. For example, business owners may not enter 
into agreements that violate state or federal laws. This was 
demonstrated in Grillo v. Global Patent Group LLC,118 in which 
the Missouri Court of  Appeals – Eastern District held that a 
nonlawyer oicer manager’s alleged agreement with a lawyer 
to share in the proits of  the lawyer’s irm was unenforceable, 
as it violated a Missouri statute prohibiting the splitting of  
compensation with nonlawyers.
 Additionally, minority shareholders, members, and partners 
may have claims against majority shareholders, managers, or 
controlling partners if  the corporate agreements between the 
parties are breached, applied oppressively, or applied in ways 
that breach the defendants’ iduciary duties.11
Conclusion
 Attorneys representing business clients must be familiar with 
the types of  agreements and provisions that can be useful, or 
should be avoided, in business entities.  What type of  entity 
and what type of  agreement best suits the client?  Should the 
agreement include exit ramps, with buyout formulas, in the event 
of  disability or death? What iduciary duties should be explicitly 
discussed in the agreement? Attorneys well-versed in the 
statutory provisions related to partnerships, LLCs, corporations, 
and joint ventures, along with the applicable case law, will be 
best able to assist their business clients.  Absent clear agreements, 
the parties’ rights when things go wrong will then often depend 
on case law dealing with iduciary duties and shareholder and 
member oppression.  
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Writing it Right
Continued from page 27
 Because courts call counsel’s hope for dramatic courtroom 
surprise “pure fantasy”68 and a “prayer,”69 appellate courts citing 
the ictional Mason normally airm the trial court’s exercise of  
discretion to exclude a witness or to limit cross-examination. 
In United States v. Beck,70 for example, the convicted defendant 
contended that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by 
limiting his counsel’s questioning of  a hostile witness. The U.S. 
Court of  Appeals for the 7th Circuit found harmless error.71  “It 
is unlikely that counsel expected [the witness] to break down on 
the stand and admit that his perjury was part of  an elaborate 
scheme to frame the defendants. Only Perry Mason enjoyed such 
moments.”72
 Courts also cite Perry Mason to reject claims that the assigned 
counsel’s assertedly inefective assistance denied the defendant 
a fair trial. One federal district court explained that “the 
Constitution guarantees only representation which is reasonably 
competent, not the perfection which exists only in iction.”73 
In yet another case, a dissenting judge observed that on 
inefectiveness claims, courts “compare counsel’s performance 
not to an ideal, Perry Mason-style defense . . .  but to what a 
reasonably competent counsel could accomplish under the 
circumstances of  the case.”74 In 2015, however, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court provided this advice: “[A] lawyer who represents 
criminal clients may be interested in watching Perry Mason . . . 
on television, and may even pick up a useful tidbit or two from 
doing so.”75
 The U.S. Court of  Appeals for the 5th Circuit has invoked 
defense counsel Mason to discuss prosecutors’ professional 
responsibilities: “[T]he prosecutor’s aim is justice. . . .  [W]hen 
it becomes apparent during the trial of  a criminal case, a la the 
celebrated ictional career of  Perry Mason, that the accused 
is innocent of  the crime with which he stands charged, the 
prosecutor has not ‘lost.’”76
L.A. Law 
 Among television dramas about lawyers and law enforcement, 
the runner-up to Perry Mason for the number of  citations in 
federal and state court opinions is undoubtedly L.A. Law, 
which has also led courts to distinguish iction from reality. 
Commentators suspected that during its run from 1986 to 
1994, the show’s ictional portrayal of  law practice not only left 
Americans with unrealistic visions about what lawyers do, but 
also encouraged many applicants to pursue law school based on 
unrealistic visions of  careers in the fast lane.77  
 Law school applications rose as L.A. Law presented the 
practice, according to one writer, as “a lifestyle package that 
involved clothes, friends, relationships, social status and that 
elusive ingredient: getting paid for championing social justice 
causes. . . .  There was never a dull client, never a boring case 
and in court they were poised and articulate.”78 After the show 
left the air, law school application numbers fell nationwide.79 
 Decisions accenting L.A. Law’s unrealistic visions include United 
States v. Prince,80 which airmed the defendant’s convictions for 
bank robbery and unlawfully using a irearm during commission 
of  a violent crime.81 The U.S. Court of  Appeals for the 10th 
Circuit began Prince with words of  caution: “[T]he would-be 
lawyer raised on the hit television series, L.A. Law, to believe 
a law degree is that golden ticket to a glamorous career of  big 
money, fast cars and intimate relationships among the beautiful 
people may think twice before sending in his or her law school 
application when word of  this case gets out.”82  
 After the trial court twice denied the assigned federal public 
defender’s requests to withdraw from the case because defendant 
Prince refused to talk to him, the defendant dropped his pants 
and urinated in front of  the jury as the panel was being sworn.83 
A court-ordered psychological examination found the defendant 
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competent to stand trial, and the court of  appeals held that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to order a 
second examination.84 
 “[F]or the one-time budding lawyer whose hopes for a 
dazzling life have now been dashed by the facts of  this case,” the 
Prince panel suggested “an alternative career in screenwriting.”85 
The panel concluded that “[u]nusual stories like this one are 
apparently standard fare for the ictional television lawyers of  
L.A. Law, who face many obstacles before cashing their paycheck 
and speeding of to another intimate dinner-party.”86
Other Television Dramas About Lawyers and Law Enforcement
 In addition to Perry Mason and L.A. Law, courts have discussed 
other television shows about lawyers and law enforcement. 
In State v. Taylor, for example, the Missouri Court of  Appeals 
concluded that the trial court committed no error when it 
permitted the prosecutor to question prospective jurors about 
their willingness to convict the defendant on eyewitness testimony 
alone.87 The panel explained that “[g]iven the prevalence of  
television shows such as CSI and Law and Order, a trend exists 
wherein juries expect the State to present physical evidence on 
every issue. The trial court does not err in allowing the State to 
ferret out such juror biases during voir dire.”88
 When the convicted defendant asserted his lack of  knowledge 
about the underlying crime because a witness at trial never 
referred to stolen tractors as “hot” or “stolen,” the U.S. Court 
of  Appeals for the 6th Circuit concluded that the witness’ 
characterizations “mean[t] nothing” because “[d]iscreet thieves 
often sell obviously stolen properly without using the lingo of  the 
stereotypical ‘Law & Order’ or ‘N.Y.P.D. Blue’ villain.”89 
 In Clingman v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected 
the convicted defendant’s contention that the prosecutor had 
improperly commented to the court about facts that did not 
concern the crimes to which the defendant had pleaded.90  
Finding that the prosecutor’s comments approached impropriety, 
two concurring justices cited Hill Street Blues (which aired from 
1981 to 1987) and repeated the advice of  the show’s morning 
roll-call police sergeant, who would end his daily brieing with, 
“Let’s be careful out there.”91  
 Courts frustrated with written or oral verbosity, name calling, 
or extraneous argument sometimes issue opinions that relay the 
classic no-nonsense instruction from Los Angeles police Sgt. 
Joe Friday (played by Jack Webb) on Dragnet, a drama series 
that “redeined the image of  law enforcement in the culture at 
large”92 while it aired from 1951 to 1959: “Just the facts, m’am, 
just the facts.”93 
 In Privitera v. City of  Phelps, the appellate court airmed 
dismissal of  a slander claim against the defendant who had 
charged the plaintif with membership in the Maia.94 The 
panel dispensed with lengthy explanation about potential harm 
to the plaintif’s reputation because (as a concurring justice 
stated) “[t]hose unaware of  the criminal ventures of  Al Capone 
have now been educated by the long-running TV series ‘The 
Untouchables,’ based on his life.”95
 Judicial opinions have discussed one foreign television 
show about lawyers. Rumpole of  the Bailey aired on the British 
Broadcasting Company (BBC), and on the Public Broadcasting 
System (PBS) in the United States. Deftly combining drama and 
comedy, the series concerned a ictional London barrister who 
usually represented criminal defendants in The Old Bailey, a 
court building in central London.96 Horace Rumpole, played by 
Leo McKern, often referred to his sometimes overbearing wife, 
Hilda, as “she who must be obeyed.”97 Courts in the United 
States have quoted barrister Rumpole by name to illustrate 
why administrative agency regulations must be obeyed,98 why 
lower courts must apply (and hence “obey”) mandates from 
higher courts,99 and why persons must heed (and hence “obey”) 
contractual obligations.100  
Television Dramas Unrelated to Lawyers and Law Enforcement 
 Federal and state judicial opinions have also cited television 
dramas that treat legal topics only sporadically, if  at all. In Mason 
v. Smithkline Beecham Corp, for example, the plaintifs – the parents 
of  a 23-year-old woman who committed suicide two days after 
taking Paxil, an anti-depressant drug similar to Prozac – alleged 
negligence by the defendant manufacturer for not warning that 
taking Paxil increased the risk of  suicide.101 The 7th Circuit 
described Prozac this way: “Anyone who has ever watched The 
Sopranos knows that it’s the drug Dr. Jennifer Meli prescribed 
for Tony Soprano after telling him ‘no one needs to sufer from 
depression with the wonders of  modern pharmacology.’”102 
 Some judges have cited Marcus Welby, M.D. (played by Robert 
Young in a drama that aired from 1969 to 1976) as the model 
family practice physician. The ictional physician, who was 
known for his house calls and soothing bedside manner, helped 
one judge discuss whether the defendant physician’s demeanor 
toward an allegedly demanding patient fell short in a medical 
malpractice action.103 Visions of  Dr. Welby also helped another 
court explain that jurors weighing expert testimony tended to 
give more weight to physician witnesses than to psychologists 
because of  “‘the Marcus Welby Efect’ from the 1970’s television 
series of  the same name.”104 
 Rod Serling’s science iction drama, The Twilight Zone (which 
aired from 1959 to 1964) helped popularize the term that 
describes the often murky “gray area” between two extremes.105 
In Larsen v. State Employees Retirement System, a former state supreme 
court judge alleged that state agencies had improperly calculated 
his retirement beneits.106 Citing the television series, the federal 
district court determined that the action “lies somewhere in the 
twilight zone of  Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.”107
 To illuminate procedural and substantive points, courts have 
cited characters and themes from a host of  other television 
dramas, including Star Trek,108 The Outer Limits,109 The Lone 
Ranger,110 The Adventures of  Superman,111 Branded,112 Dallas,113 The Six 
Million Dollar Man,114 The Bionic Woman,115 Hopalong Cassidy,116 Roy 
Rogers,117 and The Millionaire.118
 Next issue: References to TV situation comedies and 
reality shows.
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sub nom. Freeman v. Class, 911 F. Supp. 402 (D.S.D. 1995), af’d, 95 F.3d 639 (8th 
Cir. 1996).  
 55 People v. Castillo, 2007 WL 3151689 *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2007). 
 56 See, e.g., United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 493 n.1 (1st Cir. 1997); Devine v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744 & n.4 (S.D. Miss. 1999). 
 57 2014 WL 4072024 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2014).
 58 Id. at *3 n.32.
 59 Id.
 60 Noah, supra note 56, at 493 n.1.
 61 Devine, supra note 56, at 744 n.4. 
 62 United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(discussing “Perry Mason court-room drama”); State v. Norwood, 706 N.W.2d 683, 
692 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing defendant’s “on-the-stand, virtually Perry 
Mason-style confession”).
 63 Midwest Canvas Corp. v. Cantar/Polyair Corp., 2003 WL 22053582 *4 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 3, 2003). See also, e.g., In re Holman, 536 B.R. 458, 467 (Bankr. D. Or. 2015) 
(“It is a truism (Perry Mason aside) that parties virtually never admit at trial that 
they acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the opposing party.”).
 64 Johnson v. Hix Wrecker Serv., Inc., 2012 WL 18596 *1 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 
26, 2012) (“While the Court acknowledges Plaintif’s counsel’s desire to be a 
modern day Perry Mason, the fact is that litigation under the Federal Rules of  
Civil Procedure is not supposed to be merely a game, a joust, a contest; it is also 
a quest for truth and justice.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 
United States v. Schneider, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1069 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (“[T]his  
type of  a ‘Perry Mason’ moment, replete with the elements of  surprise and 
prejudice, is precisely the type of  matter that should be taken up with the court 
outside the presence of  the jury.”).
 65 United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1987) (defendant’s ofer 
of  proof  that someone else committed the crime “fall[s] far short of  establishing 
a ‘Perry Mason defense’”); In re Neumann, 374 B.R. 688, 700 n.16 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 2007) (“The eforts in cross-examination to point the blame to another, 
unidentiied person, somewhat in Perry Mason fashion, badly misired.”). 
 66 See, e.g., United States v. Frost, 2018 WL 2448467 *7 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 
May 30, 2018) (“Perry Mason moment of  trial”); United States v. Reyes, 2016 
WL 3999985 *5 (N.D. Ind. July 26, 2016) (“it isn’t likely that a Perry Mason 
moment would ensue”); In re Osejo, 447 B.R. 352, 354 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) 
(discussing the debtor’s failure to “break down on the stand a la Perry Mason 
. . . and confess”); Cohns v. State, 2017 WL 219758 *2 (Ark. May 18, 2017) (“the 
defense had its Perry Mason moment”); Bearden v. State, 62 So. 3d 656, 660 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“In seeking to recall [a witness], the defense was clearly not 
anticipating a dramatic, Perry Mason-style moment during which [the witness] 
would confess that it was he and not Bearden who” committed the crime). 
 67 State v. Weatherspoon, 514 N.W.2d 266, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
 68 Arcaro v. Silva & Silva Enters. Corp., 77 Cal. App.4th 152, 158 (1999). See 
also, e.g., Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of  Corrections, 834 F.3 263, 365 (3d Cir. 2016) (“a 
dramatic courtroom reversal is more likely in a Perry Mason script than in reality”). 
 69 United States v. Leary, 2005 WL 1385142 (D. Del. Apr. 5, 2005).
 70 625 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2010).
 71 Id. at 422.
 72 Id. at 420 & n.2.
 73Mitchell v. Scully, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14906, *12 (S.D.N.Y.).
 74 Richie v. Mullin, 417 F.3d 1117, 1136 (10th Cir. 2005) (McConnell, J., 
dissenting).  See also, e.g., Jimenez v. City of  Chicago, 830 F. Supp. 2d 432, 444 (N.D. 
Ill. 2011) (discussing Perry Mason: “real life does not work that way”).
 75 Sallee v. Tenn. Bd. of  Prof ’l Resp., 469 S.W.3d 18, 41 (Tenn. 2015).  
 76 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225-26 (5th Cir. 1990), rev’d on 
other grounds, 500 U.S. 614 (1991). See also, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 
182 (C.A.A.F. Forces 2010) (“Although we might expect a character in a Perry 
Mason melodrama to point to a defendant and brand him a liar, such conduct 
is inconsistent with the duty of  the prosecutor to ‘seek justice, not merely to 
convict.’”) (citation omitted).
 77 Michael Orey, Sex! Money! Glitz! In-House at L.A. Law, aM. lawyeR, Dec. 
1988, at 32, 34. See also Bible v. Schriro, 497 F. Supp. 991, 1023 (D. Ariz. 2007) (the 
prosecutor’s closing arguments were “an attempt to characterize his personal 
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style (in contrast to what the jurors might have seen on television shows like L.A. 
Law)”); Leonor Vivanco, Chicago Lawyers Find TV Guilty of  Excess Drama, Red eye, 
Oct. 20, 2008, at 6 (“When I was in high school . . . , it was all about ‘L.A. Law.’ 
And it presented such a glamorous courtroom-centered vision of  what being a 
lawyer was like that you couldn’t help but want to be one.”).
 78 Brigid Delaney, In Law, the Practice Bears Little Resemblance to The Practice, 
sydNey (ausTRalia) MoRNiNg heRald, Apr. 30, 2002, at 18.  
 79 John Brigham, L.A. Law, in PRiMe TiMe law, supra note 53, at 21, 21.
 80 938 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1991).
 81 Id. at 1093.
 82 Id.
 83 Id.
 84 Id. at 1094–95.
 85 Id. at 1096.
 86 Id. at 1096 n.4.
 87 317 S.W.3d 89, 94 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
 88 Id. at 95 n.2; see also, e.g., Gray v. Gelb, 2015 WL 6870048 *1 (D. Mass. 
Nov. 6, 2017) (“[T]he trial judge’s goal was probably weeding out the so-called 
‘CSI efect,’ the theory that because of  the proliferation of  crime investigation 
television dramas, jurors hold prosecutors to an unrealistic standard of  proof  
and require that every crime be proven irrefutably by high-tech gadgetry and 
scientiic analysis.”) (footnote omitted); Commonwealth v. Webster, 102 N.E.3d 381, 
389 n.6 (2018) (discussing the CSI efect); Jenny Wise, Providing the CSI Treatment: 
Criminal Justice Practitioners and the “CSI Efect,” 21 cuRReNT issues iN cRiM. jusT. 
383, 383–84 (2010); The csi effecT: TelevisioN, cRiMe, aNd goveRNaNce 141–
42 (Michele Byers & Val Marie Johnson eds., 2009); Simon A. Cole & Rachel 
Dioso-Villa, Investigating the CSI Efect’ Efect: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal 
Law, 61 sTaN. l. Rev. 1335, 1338–39 (2009).
 89 United States v. McCarley, 70 Fed. Appx. 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2003). See also, e.g., 
Dawn Keetley, Law & Order, in PRiMe TiMe law, supra note 53, at 33, 38; Richard 
Clark Sterne, N.Y.P.D. Blue, id. at 87, 94. 
 90 23 P.3d 27 (Wyo. 2001). 
 91 Clingman, 23 P.3d at 32 (Golden, J., concurring). See also Dean v. Harris Cty., 
2013 WL 5214351 *2 n.5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2013) (“Miranda prescribes . . . four 
warnings familiar to every student of  criminal procedure and police procedural 
dramas from Hill Street Blues to Law & Order.”). See generally Susan Beth Farmer, 
Hill Street Blues, in PRiMe TiMe law, supra note 53, at 17, 17. 
 92 Steven D. Stark, supra note 8, at 31–32
 93 Counts v. Bryan, 182 S.W.3d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see also, e.g., 
Spano v. Boeing Co., 2015 WL 11144498 *1 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2015) (order) (“To 
paraphrase the great American philosopher Jack Webb, in his role in Dragnet, 
‘just the facts, ma’am.’ The parties are cautioned to stick to the facts.”); Abernathy 
v. Comm’r of  Corr., 2015 WL 4430375 *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2015); Aquifer 
Gardens in Urban Areas v. Fed. Highway Adm., 779 F. Supp.2d 542, 550 n.33 (W.D. 
Tex. 2011) (citing j. Michael hayde, My NaMe’s fRiday: The uNauThoRized 
BuT TRue sToRy of dRagNeT aNd The filMs of jack weBB 73 (2001)).   
 94 435 N.Y.S.2d 402, 406–07 (App. Div. 1981).
 95 Id. at 407 (Cardamone, J., concurring).
 96 Jackson v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 2d 514, 538 (W.D.N.C. 2009) (defense 
counsel “exude[d] the persona of  ‘Rumpole of  the Bailey’,” and was “dogged 
and zealous in his representation” of  the defendant).  See generally John Denvir, 
Rumpole of  the Bailey, in PRiMe TiMe law, supra note 53, at 145, 146.
 97 John Denvir, supra note 96, at 145–47.
 98 Harriscom Svenska, AB v. Harris Corp., 3 F.3d 576, 577 (2d Cir. 1993).
 99 Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Fin. Ind. Reg. Auth., Inc., 684 F. Supp.2d 407, 409 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); State v. Drakeford, 777 A.2d 202, 211 & n.3 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) 
(Landau, J., concurring), af’d, 802 A.2d 844 (Conn. 2002). 
 100 Horner v. Bagnell, 2015 WL 3522513 *9 n.8 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 11, 2015).
 101 596 F.3d 387 389-90 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 102 Id. at 393 & n.5; see also, e.g., United Bhd. of  Carpenters and Joiners v. Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Dep’t, 770 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (in a civil RICO action, 
discussing “no show job” portrayed in The Sopranos: No Show (HBO television 
broadcast Sept. 22, 2002)); State v. Fitzpatrick, 880 N.W.2d 519 (Table), 2016 
WL 146663 *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2016) (“The inale of  the Sopranos was 
ambiguous; the prosecutor’s statement here, not so much”); Ying Lu v. Lezel, 45 F. 
Supp.3d 86, 99 (D.D.C. May 27, 2014) (discussing “Sopranosesque igure”).
 103 Wozniak v. Lipof, 750 P.2d 971, 991 (Kan. 1988) (McFarland, J., dissenting).
 104 Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 273-74 & n.6 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2010). See 
also, e.g., Mitchell v. Comm’r of  Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 4507791 *6 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 
2016) (discussing “the model of  service being provided by a single Marcus Welby-
type physician acting alone”); Pater v. Comm’r of  Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 3477220 
*6 (N.D. Ohio June 27, 2016) (“The truth is that Marcus Welby has long since 
retired.”).
 105 gaRy geRaNi & Paul h. schulMaN, faNTasTic TelevisioN 35, 38 (1977); 
Steven D. Stark, supra note 8, at 85–86 (The Twilight Zone “somehow permeated 
the consciousness of  the entire culture”).
 106 553 F. Supp.2d 403, 409 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
 107 Id. at 413; see also Lone Star Security & Video, Inc. v. City of  Los Angeles, 827 
F.3d 1192, 1202 (Owens, J., concurring) (“That is a dimension we should avoid,” 
citing Twilight Zone episode); KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Walsh v. 
Comey, 118 F. Supp. 3d 22, 26 (D.D.C. July 13, 2015) (discussing “cases involving 
scenarios more appropriate to Rod Serling’s ‘The Twilight Zone’”). 
 108 McCarthan v. Dir. of  Goodwill Indus-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1158 & 
n. 31 (11th Cir. 2017) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (discussing “the Star Trek 
universe,” with lengthy footnoted explanation); U.S. v. Norman, 87 F. Supp.3d 737, 
745 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2015); G.G. Marck & Assocs., Inc. v. U.S., 2015 WL 3757040 *10 
n.18 (U.S. Ct. Int’l Trade, June 17, 2015) (“Remarkably, each expert chose exactly 
the same words to express his opinion. . . .  No doubt, a human example of  
Vulcan mind meld,” citing 1966 Star Trek episode); Nittany Outdoor Advert., LLC v. 
College Twp., 2014 WL 12740630 *2 (M.D. Pa. July 22, 2014) (discussing plaintif’s 
eligibility for attorneys’ fees; “Boldly going where no party in this case had gone 
before [is] always a dangerous enterprise”); Ryan v. Wright, 2018 WL 2246882 
*4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2018) (discussing “a Star Trek-like teleportation 
device”): In re Marriage of  Belnap, 2007 WL 1632365 *4 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 
2007) (rejecting argument that all Calif. statutes are void under the Northwest 
Ordinance of  1787; “With apologies to the former television series Star Trek, we 
decline ‘to boldly go where no [rational analysis] has gone before.’”) (citing Star 
Trek (NBC television broadcast 1966–1969) opening monologue). 
 109  Kennedy v. Kennedy, 41 N.Y.S.3d 449 (Table), 2016 WL 3677229 *4 n.4 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. June 9, 2016).




 110 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding 
validity of  copyright on a work whose character had a distinctive appearance 
but no name; “the Lone Ranger doesn’t have a proper name either (at least not 
one known to most of  his audience – actually he does have a proper name, John 
Reid), so that can’t be critical”); Aquifer Gardens in Urban Areas v. Fed. Highway Adm., 
779 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 n.13 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (“The Lone Ranger is a ictional 
masked Texas Ranger who . . . has become an enduring icon of  American 
culture.”); E.M.B. v. A.M.B., 55 N.Y.S.3d 692 (Table), 2016 WL 1136206 *1 
n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 5, 2017) (divorce action; “The legal status of  a ‘co-
respondent’ requires this court to voyage back to what were called in The Lone 
Ranger television show, ‘the thrilling days of  yesteryear,’ when adultery was the 
most common form of  divorce litigation.”).  
 111 Gardner v. Comm’r of  Internal Rev., 845 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(rejecting appellants’ arguments of  separate identities; “This seems a little like 
arguing that Clark Kent is not Superman. Certainly Superman displays abilities 
that Clark Kent denies having, but they are one and the same.”); In re Rahndee 
Indus. Servs., 2015 WL 6160288 *13 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Sept. 18, 2015) (“when 
Superman steps out of  the phone booth, Clark Kent is still alive”); Williams 
v. State, 79 A.3d 931, 941 n.6 (Md. 2013) (the defendant “does not resemble 
even vaguely Lex Luthor, the human criminal mastermind and nemesis of  
Superman”). 
 112 State v. Schad, 206 P.3d 22, 34–35 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing sentence 
that required the defendant, as a condition of  his probation, to post signs 
informing the public that he was a sex ofender; the condition was “reminiscent 
of  Branded, a television Western series [about] . . . a United States Army captain 
who had been court-martialed for cowardice and forced to leave the Army”). 
 113 Maximus, Inc. v. Lockheed Inf. Mgt. Sys. Co., 47 Va. Cir. 193 (Richmond Va. 
City Cir. Ct. 1998), af’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 524 S.E.2d 420 (Va. 
2000) (discussing “the type of  concealment and sharp practices that would make 
television’s J.R. Ewing of  ‘Dallas’ fame proud”); see generally Steven D. Stark, supra 
note 8, at 221 (Dallas “not only relected its times but also helped deine them”).
 114  Llanes v. Frontera, 2008 WL 623796 *4 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2008) 
(dismissing prisoner’s civil rights claim; “[p]laintif seeks a ‘bionic’ leg. . . . [I]n 
the 1970s ‘bionic’ limbs and body parts were addressed in the ictional television 
series ‘The Six Million Dollar Man’ and ‘The Bionic Woman.’ . . . Given the 
State of  Michigan’s current budget constraints, such a surgery would not be 
iscally responsible or feasible.”). 
 115 Id.  
 116 Lewis v. Woodford, 2007 WL 196635 *25 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2007) (“the 
once-upon-a-time ‘quick-draw’ practicing with a buck knife reasonably says 
nothing about one’s state of  mind years later. If  it did, every child who ever 
played quick-draw, a la Hopalong Cassidy or Roy Rodgers [sic], with a toy 
cap gun would do so at his own later peril in demonstrating an intent to rob”); 
Randle v. Sanders, 2016 WL 7321298 *1 & n. 1 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2016) (“As 
ictional cowboy hero Hopalong Cassidy suggests, agreements made the ‘cowboy 
way’ are held to a higher standard.”). 
 117 Lewis, supra note 116.  
 118 Val-Pak of  Cent. Conn. N., Inc. v. Comm’r Rev. Servs., 670 A.2d 343 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1994), af’d, 669 A.2d 1211 (Conn. 1996) (“(The Millionaire, it might be 
recalled, was a television program . . . in which a wealthy philanthropist, John 
Beresford Tipton, would each week give one million dollars to a total stranger 
and watch to see what was done with the money.)”). 
Court); subdivision 33.10 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – 
Transmittal of  Record by Clerk of  the Releasing Court); and 
subdivision 33.11 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Bonds – Where 
Filed – Certiication by Sherif or Peace Oicer – Cash Bonds) 
of  Rule 33, entitled “Misdemeanors or Felonies – Release 
Pending Further Proceedings,” and in lieu thereof  adopted a 
new subdivision 33.01 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Right to 
Release – Conditions); a new heading title and new subdivision 
33.02 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Warrant for Arrest – 
Conditions to be Stated on Warrant); a new subdivision 33.04 
(Misdemeanors or Felonies – Oicer Authorized to Accept 
Conditions of  Release); a new heading title and new subdivision 
33.05 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Release Hearing); a new 
subdivision 33.06 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Modiication of  
Conditions of  Release; a new subdivision 33.07 (Misdemeanors 
or Felonies – Rules of  Evidence Inapplicable); a new heading 
title and new subdivision 33.08 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – 
Rearrest of  Defendant); a new subdivision 33.09 (Misdemeanors 
or Felonies – Failure of  Court to Set Conditions or Setting of  
Inadequate or Excessive Conditions for Release – Application 
to Higher Court); a new subdivision 33.10 (Misdemeanors or 
Felonies – Transmittal of  Record by Clerk of  the Releasing 
Court); and a new subdivision 33.11 (Misdemeanors or Felonies 
– Bonds – Where Filed – Certiication by Sherif or Peace Oicer 
– Cash Bonds).
 This order becomes efective July 1, 2019.
 The complete text of  the order may be read in its entirety at 
www.courts.mo.gov.
 The Supreme Court of  Missouri, in an order dated December 
18, 2018, repealed the heading title of  subdivision 6.01, entitled 
“Annual Enrollment Fee and Statement – Exemptions – Penalties 
– Pro Hac Vice Fee,” of  Rule 6, entitled “Fees to Practice Law,” 
and adopted a new title of  subdivision 6.01, entitled “Annual 
Enrollment Fee and Statement – Exemptions – Penalties – Pro 
Hac Vice Fee – Pro Bono Waiver.”
 In the same order, the Court adopted a new subdivision 
6.01(o), entitled “Pro Bono Waiver of  Annual Enrollment Fee,” of  
subdivision 6.01, entitled Annual Enrollment Fee and Statement 
– Exemptions – Penalties – Pro HacVice Fee – Pro Bono Waiver,” 
of  Rule 6, entitled “Fees to Practice Law.”
 The Court also adopted a new Pilot Project for Pro Bono Waiver 
Under Adopted Rule 6.01(o).
 The efective date of  the Adopted Rule is January 1, 2020. 
 The efective date of  the Pilot Project is January 1, 2019.
 The complete text of  the order may be read in its entirety at 
www.courts.mo.gov.
 In an order dated December 18, 2018, the Supreme Court 
of  Missouri repealed subdivision 5.21(e), entitled “Interim 
Suspension and Final Discipline for Criminal Activities,” of  Rule 
5, entitled “Complaints and Proceedings Thereon,” and adopted 
a new subdivision 5.21(e), entitled “Interim Suspension and Final 
Discipline for Criminal Activities.”
 This order becomes efective January 1, 2019.
 The complete text of  the order may be read in its entirety at 
www.courts.mo.gov.
CORRECTION – In the November/December 2018 issue of  
the Journal of  The Missouri Bar, the efective date of  the order of  
October 15, 2018 concerning Rules 56 and 58 is July 1, 2019. It 
was erroneously listed at January 1, 2019.
Supreme Court Rule Changes
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